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The Kashmir Deadlock

by

Maj.-Gen. J. R. HARTWELL, C.B., D.S.O.

Post-War Japan

by

G. S. HUDSON

Chinese Brigands

by

W. STARK TOLLER, C.M.G., O.B.E.

Japanese Menace To British Rayon

by

VERA K. WATKINS

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EASTERN WORLD

INDONESIA

It is to be hoped that the recent talks between Dr. M. Hatta, Premier of the Indonesian Republic and Dr. H. van Mook, Dutch Lieutenant Governor-General, will have eliminated some of the differences which threaten to undo some of the achievements of the *Renville* Agreement. While it is understandable that the Dutch desire to create an early and efficient administrative reorganisation, it looks as if they are acting too quickly not only for the Republicans, but even for their own progressive elements at the Hague. The creation of the Interim Federal Government for instance—without Republican participation, but "leaving the door open" for them to join—has met with indignant criticism in Jocja, where it is pointed out that it is not possible to have such a government without the Republic, since the Republic is the spear-head of nationalism in all parts of Indonesia. Its formation at the present moment cannot be binding for the Republic as it only covers those territories outside the Republic. Also, the Republic reminds that negotiations for an Interim Government for the whole of Indonesia have not yet commenced. In addition, Dutch recognition of the *Negara Padoendan* in West Java and the premature plebiscite of Madoera, have met with violent protest in Republican circles. They recall that, according to the *Renville* Agreement, a plebiscite is to be held to determine whether the people of Java, Madoera and Sumatra wish to join the Republic or another state within the United States of Indonesia, and that such plebiscite is to take place "within a period of not less than six months or more than one year from the signing of this Agreement," to be conducted under the observation of the Committee of Good Offices, should either party so desire. It is difficult to see why these stipulations were ignored.

INDIAN STATES

India's energetic step to integrate the approximately 550 States in the political life of the country is a milestone in

important progress. It not only sorts out the jigsaw puzzle on her map, but makes away with arbitrary State barriers and antediluvian prerogatives. The development is bound to have beneficial repercussions on trade and will undoubtedly simplify the country's administration, even if considerable self-administration is left to the various Unions of States. The most important fact, however, is that the power is now being transferred to the people. It is a good sign that this constitutional process has met with commendable co-operation from most of the Rulers. Progressive States, like Travancore, Mysore, Cochin and others, are fitting smoothly into the new pattern, but it will be interesting to see whether the Nizam of Hyderabad will come to terms with the Indian Government or whether this will again be frustrated, or at least delayed, by the militant organisation of *Ittehad-al-Muselmin*.

VIET-NAM

The tension in Indo-China has not relaxed in any way, and one wonders why the comparative success of the U.N. Commission in Indonesia has not inspired France to ask the United Nations for similar help. It is clear that the French have not succeeded in cutting off the Viet-Nameese guerrillas from the Chinese frontier, across which they obtain most of their equipment, and even if this had been achieved, it is unlikely that peaceful conditions would have been established with the help of the bayonet alone. As long as Dr. Ho Chi-Minh's devoted followers remain dissatisfied, it looks as if the French Union will remain a pipe-dream. Indeed, should France persist in trying to obtain recognition for Bao Dai, ex-Emperor of Annam, as a leader of Indo-Chinese national interests and as a substitute for Dr. Ho Chi-Minh, it is certain that she would have to grant to the former what she refused to the latter, namely the right to control Viet-Nam's foreign policy and armed forces. Whether they would succeed in replacing Dr. Ho Chi-Minh in the hearts of a considerable section of the people remains to be seen, but may be doubted owing to the emotional implications involved. To accuse the Viet-Minh of being Communist is futile as long as this cannot be proved on an international platform. The struggle has been dragging

on far too long, and recourse to the U.N. is long overdue, if only for the purpose of ventilating the differences in the open.

KASHMIR

Since the article by Mr. Footitt was written,* discussions in the Security Council have been temporarily suspended to allow the Indian delegation to return for consultations with their Government. They had gone to Lake Success expecting a walkover, but as the days went by and the Council steadily refused to see the Kashmir issue as a clear cut case of territorial violation, or to exclude from it the wider considerations which Sir Zafrullah Khan introduced, they became increasingly puzzled and resentful. Finally, when the Council appeared sympathetic to Pakistan's demand for the withdrawal of Indian troops before the proposed plebiscite, they saw their whole case in jeopardy. If Pakistan had been unable to prevent the infiltration of large numbers of Pathan tribesmen into Kashmir their ability now to secure the removal of these same tribesmen must be open to question, even assuming the best of intentions, with which India seems in no mood to credit Pakistan anyway.

Faced with the possibility of defeat on the vital issue of the withdrawal of their troops, the Indian delegation had no option but to break off discussions, secure a breathing space and return for fresh briefing from their Government. The time gained has been utilised by India firstly in publicising their keen disappointment and "disillusion," and secondly in dissolving the embarrassing partnership with the Maharaja, who has been forced to abjure everything but his title. Sheikh Abdullah becomes Prime Minister under a purely constitutional ruler, but it is to Pandit Nehru that he owes his appointment and to the Indian army that he must look to keep it. Nevertheless, a high card in Pakistan's hand has been discounted. It can no longer be claimed that the insurgents are opposing an oppressive and corrupt tyranny, and with the romantic element gone their struggle becomes a naked fight for power. The Indian delegates are now back in the U.S.A. with their hands strengthened, but the prospects of a settlement have not been improved.

*See p. 4.

WAR CLOUDS OVER INDIA

by R. L. C. Footit (Calcutta)

IN his speech to the Associated Chambers of Commerce last December, Pandit Nehru said that India and Pakistan could not be just indifferent to one another; they had to be either friends or enemies. That they should remain friends is the sincere wish of the leaders on both sides. Nevertheless, the ugly possibility of conflict is frequently discussed in undertones. Had either Dominion been looking for a *casus belli* the communal massacres, the looting and abductions in the Punjabs, in Delhi and in Karachi, would have provided it abundantly. But war has, hitherto, been simply impossible. Both Dominion Governments have had more than enough to do in taking up the reins of administration and in dealing with the influx of refugees. Neither in India nor in Pakistan was there the organisation, military or civil, with which to fight the other.

But with the passage of time war will become once more a physical possibility. There is probably not a single educated man in the whole peninsula who does not fully realise that an inter-Dominion war would ruin his country, even should it end victoriously (which is a firm conviction on both sides). In Kashmir, both Governments are taking lines which are very firm already, and any further stiffening would almost certainly lead to open hostilities. India is just holding back, probably against considerable pressure from her military commanders, from bombing the towns in Pakistan, just over the Kashmir border, which are said to be the bases of the raiding tribesmen. Pakistan is just holding back from going to the assistance of their Muslim brothers within Kashmir, whom they consider to be fighting for dear life to throw off an oppressive, corrupt and hated tyranny.

Seen from India, Kashmir is being wantonly invaded by hordes of Pathan hooligans, who have been transported and supplied with modern arms by Pakistan; the whole State is rallying in defence under Sheikh Abdullah, the old champion of the people's rights and now leader of the Interim Kashmir Government; the Indian forces flown in, in the nick of time to prevent the sack of Srinagar, are on an errand of mercy; their despatch was perfectly legal because the Maharaja had previously signed a Deed of Accession making Kashmir a part of Indian territory, and had urgently called for them.

Seen from Pakistan, oppressed co-religionists have risen in revolt against their Dogra ruler and his clique of Hindu Pundits; Sheikh Abdullah is a renegade Muslim, now the tool of the Maharaja, without any popular backing; the hot-blooded, independent tribesmen of the Afghan border have gone to the aid of the insurgents, and, short of military action (which would have lost the Pakistan Government all their popular support) could not have been stopped; these Pathans were on the war-path, anyway, in revenge for the slaughter of Muslims in East Punjab and neighbouring States; that they were diverted from raiding India to a Holy War of liberation in Kashmir must be considered providential. It is easy to see that when two parties have such hopelessly divergent pictures of the

matter under dispute the chances of mutual agreement are slender. And when each picture is loaded with so much emotion-stirring colour, the situation is bound to be explosive.

Neither picture is really inaccurate. The Kashmir tangle is sufficiently complex to contain both. Kashmir is a wild and beautiful country in the heart of the Himalayas, with a population of four million, about 80 per cent. Muslim. Its world-famous Vale, a long and broad valley 5,000 feet above sea level, well watered and marvellously fertile, enjoys an almost perfect climate. To the North and East are tremendous mountain ranges; to the South and West are submontane tracts which contain the comparatively small province of Jammu, where the majority community is Hindu. The whole of the Eastern part comprises the province of Ladakh, Tibetan in everything but name. Outside the Vale communications are very poor; it takes about a month, for instance, to travel from Srinagar to either Gilgit or Leh.

In the mountains to the North the scattered tribes have everywhere risen in revolt against the Maharaja and declared for Pakistan. They are now reinforced by Pathans from Swat and Chitral and there is no opposition. But from the Vale the raiders were quickly pushed back by Indian troops—not, however, before they had pillaged and plundered over a large area and thereby lost to Pakistan a great deal of sympathy. Most of the people of the Vale, Muslims as well as Hindus, seem to have rallied to Sheikh Abdullah, though his writ does not run in the mountains. In the Poonch area, the scene of the present fighting, the raiders are clearly receiving a good deal of local support. The Azad Kashmir Government has been formed by insurgent Kashmiris, but it is difficult to say how far its authority extends. Only Jammu province, with its Hindu majority, remains fully loyal to the Maharaja's Government; there the Muslims have suffered brutalities perhaps as great as those inflicted elsewhere by the raiders.

The reference to the Security Council of U.N.O. was the last and only hope of settling the future of Kashmir peacefully. Had no court of appeal existed the situation must have deteriorated into open war, as patiences became exhausted by interminable, indecisive and (for India at least) expensive skirmishes in the mountains. The public speeches at that time were very illuminating. Pandit Nehru, announcing the decision to refer to U.N.O. was almost apologetic; it was as if he felt he had been obliged, most reluctantly, to administer a mortal blow to a friend and neighbour. But from Pakistan there came not fear or fulmination, but rejoicing. Subsequent positional play has been entirely according to expectation. India has tried to limit the issue to a consideration of her own picture—aggression against her territory with the connivance of Pakistan. Pakistan has countered with a long list of general charges against India (some with only the flimsiest foundation, if any at all), in order to widen the issue and include the case of Junagadh. Junagadh is a Hindu State in Kathiawar, the Muslim ruler of which

acceded to Pakistan violently against the wishes of the inhabitants. An impossible situation was created, and in order to save bloodshed the Indian Union intervened. That they were right to do so can hardly be doubted, but the precedent is a little awkward for them now.

So far the Security Council have persuaded both sides to agree to a three-man Commission of investigation, and though there will be a lot of wrangling about terms of reference, both sides will be anxious for the Commission to arrive on the scene of action with the least possible delay. It seems likely that the Commission will be forced to propose a compromise that both Dominions will resent. The mountain areas that have already *de facto* acceded to Pakistan could not easily be reduced by India, even armed with U.N.O. authority. Equally, Jammu could hardly be forced into Pakistan. And in Srinagar and the Vale, which is the heart of Kashmir, a miniature socialist,

progressive, non-communal "republic" seems to have sprung up under Sheikh Abdullah, accepting the Maharaja only as a constitutional monarch. Sheikh Abdullah, besides being the friend and old comrade-in-arms of Pandit Nehru, in the not very distant days of the struggle for State reforms, is sincerely convinced that the best interests of Kashmir lie in joining the Indian Union. But whether he can carry with him a majority even of the Muslims of the Vale in a free plebiscite remains to be seen.

The one hopeful factor in the situation is that the reputation of U.N.O. stands so high in both Dominions that neither is likely to flout its decision. There are no two countries more strongly idealist in international affairs. Though events which neither could control have pushed them to the threshold of war, both are, at heart, genuinely anxious to work for international peace.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir, situated in the extreme north of the Indian sub-continent, covers an area of 84,471 square miles, and is the largest of the Indian States. To the north-east it is bordered by Tibet; to the north by Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang); to the north-west by the Soviet Republic of Turkestan and Afghanistan; to the west it borders Pakistan; and to the south, Pakistan and India. The country is almost entirely mountainous. Srinagar is the summer and Jammu the winter capital of the State. The Jhelum Valley road connects Srinagar with Pakistan via Rawalpindi and Abbottabad. The Banihal road provides a link between Srinagar and Jammu over the Banihal Pass. From Jammu one road leads to Sialkot in the Pakistan Province of West Punjab and another to Pathankot in East Punjab (India). According to the census of 1941, the total population of the State was 4,021,616. This was made up of: Muslims 77.11 per cent.; Hindus 20.12 per cent.; Sikhs, Buddhists and others 2.77 per cent. The majority of the Hindus are found in the Jammu District, and Srinagar City also has a fairly large Hindu population. The present dynasty, represented by Maharaja Sir Hari Singh, has ruled Jammu and Kashmir State as at present constituted for just on 100 years by virtue of the Treaty of Amritsar, 1846, concluded by Raja Gulab Singh with the British. At that time Gulab Singh held Jammu, Ladakh and Baluchistan, while Kashmir and Gilgit were under the Sikh rulers of Lahore. With the defeat of the Sikhs in the Punjab by British

forces, the Kashmir and Gilgit territories held by them were transferred to the present dynasty.



THE KASHMIR DEADLOCK

by Maj-Gen. J. R. Hartwell, C.B., D.S.O.

TO anyone for whom events nearer home have not entirely obscured those in Kashmir, it must surely be a matter for puzzlement why neither India nor Pakistan have made any appreciable progress in any direction as a result of their Lake Success Discussions, and, indeed, one may well ask, more objectively, why Pakistan, in particular, has consistently indulged in "blocking" tactics which can only have the result of prolonging the *status quo*.

The reason is perfectly clear, if too awkward to be publicly acknowledged.

Writing in *Eastern World* last August, before the two new Dominions actually came into being, I ventured to say:—

"... it seems as certain as anything can be in the Indian puzzle that Mr. Jinnah will be faced with, is in fact faced with at this moment, the same problem as has confronted the British ever since they crossed the Indus—how to subside to

the tribal wolves, and, at the same time, be the good shepherd to the lowland lambs. If he has not the 'details' of this solution to hand, ready for immediate application, the sooner he accepts the Indus as the Pakistan (Western) frontier line, the better."

Mr. Jinnah has either been amazingly astute, even for him, or equally lucky. Events in Kashmir have provided him with the almost perfect, albeit temporary, safety valve for tribal individualism (*anglice* "loot") and is, moreover, giving him time to reconstruct, in an atmosphere of comparative peace, his armed forces to a degree that it is hoped may enable them to retain control up to the Administrative Border by the time the Kashmir red herring is no longer an effective "drag." In addition to this advantage, tribal frolics Kashmirward are tying up most of the Indian Forces which can be considered remotely "operational;" delaying the reconstruction and proper

training of Indian Units and Formations; and making it absolutely certain that India is in no position whatever to take offensive action against Pakistan (whose forces are already further advanced towards efficient reconstruction than those of her "sister" Dominion), while the latter is *accroché* in Kashmir.

A good deal has appeared in the Press, here and in India, regarding losses incurred by the Tribes in attacks against Indian Forces on the defensive, and a general impression created that the latter are well "on top" of the former when it comes to a fight. The Tribal losses in a simple action have been guessed as high as two thousand. If these figures are even approximately correct, the shock to Mr. Jinnah's humanitarianism must be at least partially assuaged by the satisfaction of knowing that tribal fanaticism in what, after all, is Pakistan's cause, must have reached a pitch at no time previously approached since the introduction of automatic small arms fire. But even if the figures quoted are not, as I believe them to be, fantastic, where precisely is it getting India? I suggest exactly nowhere. The testing time will come when, and if, the Indian Forces assume the offensive on the necessary large scale. We are told that such an offensive was almost to be undertaken when seasonal rains and snow caused its abandonment. And very nice too. In point of fact all my information indicates that the state of leadership in the more junior grades (as distinct from administrative capacity in the higher) of the Indian Forces simply do not permit of their taking the offensive on the necessary

scale with any good hope of success, and the present situation is likely to continue until such time (possibly not very far distant, admittedly) when the diminishing returns of "loot" available in Kashmir convinces the tribesmen that the game is no longer worth the candle. This will be an extremely sorry day for Mr. Jinnah and Sir George Cunningham.

India's position is not so easy to appreciate. Obviously, in the short view, nothing would please her more than that Pakistan should have to keep the Tribes amused rather than that she should have to do it herself in Kashmir. Desperately, she wants to withdraw her forces—on her own conditions and without losing too much face. But one wonders if the longer war ever worries her at all. One has heard lately of Lahore bazaar swarming with the tribesmen and Kuttok dances round the site of Lawrence's statue. Shades of the great! As every Indian traveller knows, Lahore is the halfway-house between the Khyber and Delhi. Is India completely happy at the idea of a Pakistan unable to limit Tribal aggression (with all that may lie behind the latter) before her own forces are in order, or, perhaps, a strong Sikh Confederation stands between her and the Ravi. So even for India the settlement of the Kashmir dispute requires very careful timing and her leaders must feel torn more ways at once than those of Pakistan. Any "adjudications" from Lake Success seeking a solution will assuredly find themselves in amazing cross-currents.

PUNJAB IMPRESSIONS

by Peter Rogerson

(Who has just returned from the E. Punjab)

NARINDER and I seldom found moments of leisure during the past six months, packed as each day was with ceaseless activity and emotional strain. It was rarely that, as one such long, anxious day was flickering to a close, we bumped into one another and threw ourselves into the huge leather chairs arrayed in our new mess, to steal a few minutes relaxation. Even when we did, the events in the Punjab were so momentous and our minds so inevitably preoccupied with them, that to talk of anything else was out of the question. How difficult I found it to be detached in the face of the tempo of everyday events to analyse my thoughts, to reach conclusions. We sat there in silence as the light grew dim.

Narinder switched on the wireless. I did not listen: my mind soared and wandered over memories and experiences printed indelibly in my mind—to Ferozepur, to the bridge and the never-ending column of Sikh refugees from Lyallpur. I saw them again, some trudging with pathetic little bundles, some crouched bewildered on overladen, groaning carts, the bullocks struggling and under-fed, their necks raw and bleeding from the weight of the yokes; the faded, filthy clothes bleached by the sun and caked with the billowy dust; the relentless clouds of flies settling in the sore eyes of the children, and thick on

loosely bound turbans; the coughing, the crying, the quiet bent bodies in the back of the carts; the cholera spitefully taking the lives of credulous peasants even now they were safe in India.

Safe, indeed. What of the rain, more pitiless and persistent than the sun. For a whole week it poured down, drenching ill-clad, sick men and women. Then the floods. As if fate mocked at them; as if losing home and happiness was not enough. What a scene it had been near Ludhiana. Tens of thousands of Muslim refugees struggling to reach the road as the water rose, their precious bundles jettisoned, and only the very tops of a few of the thousands of bullock carts peeping over the surface of the water. Then the road itself was gone beneath the flood. Thousands groped around and women could not find their children. The memory of an old man quivering and struggling on the ground and collapsing dead in the water, and of a baby born amidst it all will never leave my mind.

Somewhere in these struggling lakhs of refugees were the relatives of nearly half of my men, and of many of my friends. What a task it was to try to search them out: to get the vital news of their safety for men in great sus-

pense. It was meeting individuals in the midst of the trekking columns, hearing their stories which drove home the measure of the tragedy in my mind. The inadequacy of reception arrangements was exasperating. There and then it seemed to be callousness, but on reflection it was not. The position overwhelmed officials who had not the staff to go round. Food, clothing and medical aid could not be magically conjured up. The trains were stopped and transport was desperately short.

My thoughts left the refugees and turned to other matters contributing to the emotional strain. What an ever present distraction the attitude towards remaining British officers and officials was. Whence it came, and the extent of its justification is a complex question, but it certainly was a reality. How disturbing to struggle hard to help, to identify one's self with interests and feelings and yet to sense the drama of anti-British feeling. There was, indeed, consolation in the appreciation of close associates and one's own unit in a personal sense, but the general sentiment was a great distraction. "Some British officers aren't working as conscientiously as they might!"—"They're bitter that Congress kicked them out!"—"Look

at the number of British opting for Pakistan!"—"They always did prefer the Muslims."—"Pakistan could never have been a force without British connivance." All these sentiments, from varying sources, were a great handicap to those who were sincerely trying to help. But how understandable it was that at times of such controversy they should wish to see their own nationals at the helm; how natural it was that the past swelled up against the present; that there was misunderstanding and generalisation on the part of both British and Indians. It was silly to resent it.

Yet, in this avalanche of mixed emotions one thing was emerging clearer as I thought; one feeling transcending all. Sometimes I saw it in the quiet dignity and cheerfulness of refugees in such degrading circumstances; sometimes in the deep admiration I felt for my own men who in spite of suspense and tragedies, beside which my small preoccupations were nothing, continued to go out in parties to help others.

"You know, Peter—it's worth even all this to be free!" It was Narinder. I jerked my mind back to the present. Yes, we had reached the same conclusion in our thoughts.

RECORD AIR-LIFT

by Hugh Latimer

THROUGHOUT the ages, oppressed minorities fleeing from burning, killing and looting mobs, must have prayed for some superhuman agency to descend from the clouds and fly them by air to a safe country. Last autumn's communal outburst in India and Pakistan proved that, although man cannot yet control himself, he can put his mastery over the air to good purpose as well as bad. Between September and November, 1947, a total of 43,500 refugees of minority communities in India and Pakistan were flown by air to safety. More people were carried than during the German invasion of Crete or the British relief of Imphal in 1945. British Overseas Airways Corporation, who carried out the air-lift in two operations (not consecutive) at the behest of the respective Governments, have given a colourful account of the airmen's exploit in two pamphlets entitled "Operation Pakistan" and "Operation India."

Initiative first came from the Pakistan Government. An immense amount of work was involved in the formation of a new state and there was a crying need in Karachi for the trained officials who had opted for Pakistan. Of these, 7,000 civil servants and their wives, children, servants and sweepers, were held up in Delhi because the rail services were disrupted and open to ambush at the frontiers. Time was pressing: it was feared that at any moment Delhi itself would "go up." On the 26th August, the Air Ministry in London was asked for its help. Thirty-six hours later the first Dakota arrived and by the first day of September the first lift from Delhi was completed. Altogether 23 aircraft took part and at the end of the operation a fortnight later, an average of 600 passengers a day were being carried. While the organisation and air-

fields were those of the B.O.A.C., only twelve of the 23 aircraft were provided by them; the remaining eleven were sent by British charter companies. Air chartering is a growing enterprise in Britain and proved its value on this occasion as a national reserve of planes and flying experience. The air fleet brought vaccine to Lahore where an epidemic was raging, and carried 1,500 people, fifty tons of food and half a ton of medical supplies to Delhi, where starvation threatened the refugees and the ground staff at the airport.

Less than a month after Mr. Jinnah had seen the organisation depart, practically the same fleet took part in a yet more ambitious project, this time for the Government of India. This was to fly to India the thousands of Hindus and others who were isolated in stations all over Pakistan. After refuelling, the planes took Mohammedan refugees on the journey out from Delhi, so that altogether, from October 20th to end-November, 14,000 people were transferred to Pakistan, and 21,000 from Pakistan to Ambala and Delhi. The terror-stricken determination of the refugees to get themselves and their baggage on to the aircraft at all costs did not simplify the task. Only 44 lb. per person were nominally allowed, but these emigrants had every cherished possession with them: to drop anything was never to see it again. In the early days it was dangerous for the aircraft to get off or land, because the crowds and their baggage obstructed the runway. An even greater menace were the vultures and hawks in the sky above the refugees' camps. One hawk crashed into the cockpit and injured a first officer: another put an engine out of action. Flying was not easy, and most of the airmen had not been in India before. But full civil standards of

flying maintenance and loading were maintained and there was not a single passenger casualty.

All seats in the interior of aircraft were removed, so that the maximum load could be carried. One Bristol Wayfarer of Silver City Airlines lifted 119 persons (including children) with 44 lb. of baggage each. On one occasion an aircraft disembarked one more passenger than it had embarked, for a baby was born on the journey. Some of the refugees were wounded, many had been on the road for days and all were hungry and had been in fear of their lives. When the plane was airborne the crew did what they could to help. But the major task of rehabilitating the refugees lay, and still lies, at the camps where they had gone to face poverty and the unknown.

Many lessons were learnt:— the need to strip the interiors of furniture, the importance of being self-sufficient in spares (each aircraft came out from Britain loaded with its own) and the organisation of housing, food and sleep for the personnel. In the earlier operation Dakotas carried a maximum of 57, in the later 86. During the Delhi famine in September the Corporation staff there became

members of the R.A.F. mess, but for the bigger operation next month, the catering service was able to provide rest, food and relaxation from its own resources. In both cases all maintenance work and refuelling had to be done after dark.

The thousands carried by air represented only a small part of the total number of refugees in the two dominions. Those who could, because they were in border provinces, went by road. However, many more Mohammedans remained in India than were able to reach Pakistan, and there are still thousands of Hindus in Kashmir and Eastern Bengal. Should the demon of communal hate reappear in India or anywhere else in the multi-communal East, any Government unable to control it will have to remember this example. Air transportation probably costs less in the long run than the alternative of allowing them to die by hunger or massacre. For those countries which have a reserve of air transport, there is a moral obligation to keep it ready for such a cause as this. One of the outstanding features of the whole affair was the speed with which help was brought from London.

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN PAKISTAN

by G. FitzGerald-Lee

THE Government of Pakistan has decreed that English shall be the official language of the new dominion.

It is, therefore, interesting to consider the effect of this pronouncement in view of the literacy of the peoples, their natural aptitudes and methods of learning languages and the extent to which English is already understood in the dominion.

In the West it is customary to learn the written language together with the spoken, and good readers in, and writers of, "foreign" languages are more common than fluent or eloquent speakers. In the East, generally speaking, the converse is true; it is the speaking of a "foreign" language which comes first, the written language not often being learnt; thus many orientals are eloquent speakers in languages in which they are technically illiterate.

The decree is even more important in its international aspects than its local spheres of influence. Urdu, or Hindustani, the official language of the new India, is generally understood in both the new dominions, but it is very little used outside these countries. Bengali is used by about forty millions in Eastern Pakistan, and Punjabi by ten millions in Western Pakistan; each of these two leading languages is useful only in its own part of the country, and nowhere outside. Although Bengali is the only important language in that part of Pakistan, the Western part of the dominion has several important languages apart from Punjabi: Sindhi, of Sind; Baluchi, of Baluchistan; Pushtu, of the North West Frontier; Gurmukhi, of the Sikhs, and others, none of which is understood outside Pakistan.

By nominating English as the official language, the government has elected to include its country linguistically with the great commercial groups of the world: the British Commonwealth and the United States of America; India

would have been wise to have done the same. One more country to be added to the English-speaking nations of the world, although the increase in the actual number of speakers is only at present a few tens of thousands.

The ability to read and write is rapidly on the increase in Pakistan; at the beginning of this century only three per cent. of the inhabitants were literate, today the percentage is eight, a great increase in only fifty years considering that it involves seventy million peoples.

Literacy is naturally much more prevalent in urban areas than in rural, as both the need for, and opportunities of acquiring it are greater in towns than in the country; thirty per cent. of males and ten per cent. of females in urban areas are literate.

Female literacy is generally very low, only about one female being literate for every ten males. The main reasons for this are economic: there is a great difficulty in obtaining women teachers, and the early age of marriage in some cases, or domestic circumstantial compulsion (as was also the case in England not so long ago) in others causing girls to be taken from school before reaching even the standard of primary school-leaving certificate, literacy being then considered unnecessary to their lives as wives or wage-earners.

The leading literate communities in Pakistan today are mainly "minorities." The Parsees, of Karachi, have the highest rate of literacy: eighty per cent; and half of them are literate in English. Nearly half the Jews are literate, a third of them in English. One-third of the Christians are literate, one in every ten in English. One-tenth of the Sikhs are literate, two per cent in English. Most of these minorities are urban, commercial peoples, which explains their high and increasing rate of literacy. Seven per cent of the Muslims are literate, which means five million people, more than all the Pakistan Christians,

Sikhs, Parsees and Jews put together.

The Western Pakistani group of languages is based mainly on Arabic and Persian, and written, in the Persi-Arabic script, from right to left; the Eastern Pakistani group is based on Hindi, and written, in Hindi characters, from left to right.

The Persi-Arabic languages contain certain equivalent sounds to all the English consonants and vowels except "y", "a" as in "that" and "o" as in "not"; they also contain several gutturals which are, of course, unnecessary in English. They differ considerably from English, however, in all being strictly phonetic languages, being written exactly as they are spoken, and vice versa. In each of Arabic, Persian and Hindi there is only one main exception to this rule: In Arabic, the "l" of the definite article "al" is silenced when preceding one of the "solar" letters (t, s, d, z, r, sh, l or n) and the value of the solar letter is doubled, thus *el bet* (the house), *el husan* (the horse), but *esh-shams* (the sun), and *er-ragil* (the man), although these latter two are written with the "l" of the definite article in each case. In Persian the sole exception is that when in a word the vowel "u" is preceded by the guttural "kh" and followed by "a" it entirely loses its sound; thus "table" written *khuan* is pronounced "khan", and *khuaha*, "sister," is pronounced "khahir." In Hindi the short "i" pronounced after a consonant is written before it, e.g., *girma* the verb "to fall" is actually written "igirma." As these are the sole main exceptions it can be realised how very much more difficult it is for orientals to learn English than it is for other occidentals, the languages of most of which contain many complications in the pronunciation of written words.

The grammars of all the natural languages vary considerably with one another, although each has certain decided advantages over English. For example, about ninety per cent of Arabic verbs have tri-literal roots, from which all the "forms and measures" are evolved by means of "servile letters" (y, t, s, m, n, u, a); the remainder of the verbs have quadri-literal roots, and the expansion of all the verbs in each group are regular, with very few exception (*surd* or "doubled" verbs, infirm or imperfect verbs, and a small group of *hamzated* verbs with an "a" as one of the radicals). As further example, the infinitives of all the verbs in the Hindi language end in "na"; when this is deleted, the root of the verb remains, from which all the tenses are formed.

Due to the considerable variations between the grammars of each language however, the grammar of the English language is found by the people themselves to be no more difficult to learn than that of any Pakistani language. Even the fact that Hindi and English are written in one direction and the Persi-Arabic languages another gives the Bengali Musulman very little advantage over his Punjabi brother in the writing of English.

For many years now a latinised form of writing Urdu has been widely practised in India. It is called "Roman Urdu." Although its rules of spelling words have often been changed, it has served the purpose of introducing to millions of Indians the English alphabet and anglicised phonetics. The official newspaper of the military forces the *Fauji Akhbar* (Military News) was for many years printed in four different editions: Urdu in the Persi-Arabic

script, Urdu in the Hindi script, Roman Urdu, and English.

Although Roman Urdu has done much to pave the way for English in both dominions, yet its representation of sounds still leaves much to be desired, as a result of which Britons already err in the pronunciation of Urdu, and Pakistanis and Indians find several differences between the pronunciation of combinations of letters when used in Roman Urdu and the general English pronunciation of the same combination. For example: *Woh har roz rat ke waqt bahar jaya karte the* ("they used to go out every night") is correctly pronounced, according to the general rules in English: *Wo hurr roze raath kay wuqt baahirr jaayaa kurrthay thay* (all "th"s as in "think"). Thus the "a" of a Roman Urdu student becomes "u" in English, "o" is lengthened by adding an "e" after the following consonant, an "e" with a line above is "ay", and so on.

However, on the whole, the idea has been very useful, and is reminiscent of Kemal Ataturk's successful experiment with the Latinisation of Turkish.

How long it will take English to spread over the rural as well as urban areas of Pakistan depends largely on to what extent the language is encouraged and enforced, for most of the people will be fairly willing to learn, and the replacement of many languages by one will greatly facilitate internal as well as, when English happens to be the language concerned, external relations.

Thanks to the knowledge propagated by British and Indian Universities, very many teachers, scientists, engineers, artists, merchants, lawyers, doctors and others are well versed in English. English has for many years been the official language of the Law in India. I once heard, on the North-West Frontier, a Sikh Counsel deliver a two-and-a-half hours' oration in English that, for mastery of English Law and rhetoric would have done credit to any K.C. at the Old Bailey; and such powers of eloquence are common to the lawyers of both Eastern and Western Pakistan. Similarly with Medicine: the valuable letters "M.D." or "M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P." often followed by the parenthetical "Edin." are seen in many parts of Pakistani bazaars, and these doctors have a complete mastery of English. Most tradesmen and shopkeepers speak English, and many do all their accounting and correspondence in the same language. The writer has often, in various parts of Pakistan, been invited to join trading conversations as an interpreter, usually to find that his services as such were quite unnecessary due to the natives concerned understanding English sufficiently well for all trading purposes.

English is therefore already understood in urban areas throughout Pakistan, and in some rural areas. The Governor-General of the Dominion, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah insists on all official pronouncements to be made in English, he himself being a master of the language. With his lead, and the following of his government, it should not now be long before English spreads throughout Pakistan, even to remote rural areas. Then another fifty, sixty or perhaps even seventy million people will have been added to the already two hundred million of English-speaking peoples in the world.

GURKHA ENLISTMENT AND THE FUTURE

by *Bamuniya*

WHEN, about May, 1947, I commenced to try to rouse some general interest in ensuring that British policy towards Nepal did not entail a betrayal of the Gurkha soldier, to whom we owe so much, the original intent of the articles which appeared under the title "Nepal and the British Connection," was rather forestalled by an announcement in the press that steps had already been taken to put in train what would approximately have been my suggestions, and the proposed articles were abridged and somewhat side-tracked in consequence. Some eight months have now elapsed since the original press statement of the broad lines on which Gurkha regiments were to be disposed, and it may be of interest to examine what further details have been made public and what may have been learned from private sources. Of these, the latter are by far the most illuminating, and clearly indicate that, to put it mildly, the real welfare of the Gurkha soldier has been of little account in the balance of political considerations.

From officially sponsored sources we learn that four regiments (eight battalions) have been "selected" to serve under the War Office. These regiments are the 2nd King Edward VII Own (The Sirmoor Rifles) and the 6th, 7th, and 10th Gurkha Rifles. This selection is interesting and somewhat of a puzzle. The normal pre-war proportion of Magar and Garung, "Khas" and Limbu and Rai regiments (coming roughly from Western and N. Central, the lowlands, and Eastern Nepal respectively) was 14, 2, 4, or 70, 10, and 20 per cent. of the 20 Gurkha battalions. For service under the War Office, the proportion becomes 14 per cent. instead of 70 per cent., nil, and 100 per cent. instead of 20 per cent. The elimination of the Khas element is probably easily accounted for as being in accordance with either the Nepal Durbar, of India, or of both, owing to the closer racial connection of the lowlander both with the Ruling House and the Rajput of the Indian Dominion. Possibly, also, owing to a greater Brahminical influence over the Khas, which has always looked somewhat askance at service across the Black Water, especially since Paui Patya (purification) fees proved disappointing in 1919-20.

The selection from amongst the 14 Magar and Garung battalions is not of general interest. That of the Sirmoor Rifles is logical, as being the unit specially connected with Lieutenant (later General) Frederick Young who first initiated the recruitment of Gurkhas for service under British leadership and commanded this Unit for 17 years. It has, from the epic of the Delhi Ridge, always had an exceptionally distinguished battle career, and is, perhaps, most intimately of any Gurkha unit connected with the British Crown and Army. For its part in the defence of the Ridge it was presented with the Truncheon by special command of Queen Victoria, to be accorded all the honours of the Sovereign's colour *in perpetuum*. A unique distinction. The close friendship with the 60th Rifles (K.R.R.C.) dates from the same shared defence. The

selection of the 6th Gurkhas is less easy to understand. This unit did not form part of the original "Gurkha Brigade" and was fairly recently formed, largely from Assam Police. It is, however, an excellent regiment and may have been recommended for inclusion by Sir William Slim, late commander of the 14th Army in Burma.

But why the 100 per cent. incidence of Limbu and Rais? Without in any way disparaging the good service rendered by the units in question, it is difficult to believe that the committee appointed by the War Office to settle details (despite its somewhat Gilbertian composition, of which more anon) had any reason themselves for this 100 per cent. decision. Both the 7th and 10th Gurkhas are, as such, of comparatively recent formation and have no historical connection with the British Army in any degree comparable to other Gurkha regiments which could be named. It is fairly certain, therefore, that the committee was influenced either by the wishes of Nepal, India or both. This opens a very wide field of speculation as to why this rather more politically instructed and temperamentally volatile class should have been less *persona grata* for inclusion either in the Indian or Nepalese forces than the more phlegmatic Garung or racially officiated Khas. But upon further speculation I prefer not to embark.

As selection of particular regiments is a *fait accompli*, we will note only once more that from the beginning political considerations almost certainly introduced by Indian influence seem to have made their appearance. But one may wonder why, with many well qualified serving and "ex" Gurkha officers available, it was considered desirable to appoint a member of a distinguished Highland regiment to lead the committee on the disposal of Gurkha units. As a mutual failing of the two races towards the bagpipes was presumably not the reason, perhaps a fear existed that a purely "Gurkha" committee would be at loggerheads over preferential treatment for their own units and officers, and would, in any case, be more difficult to handle when it came to selling the selected units if not the whole bag of tricks, down the river, should this become desirable. I wouldn't know.

But what is very evident from all the unofficial evidence available is that there has been, and up to the moment of writing still is, quite unjustifiable chaos over the appointment of officers to the selected units, due to an attitude in local high quarters which places the wishes of Pandit Nehru well ahead of the interests of the British Army in the matter of the well being of the latter's newly acquired units. The latter should, in all decency, be regarded as a *corps d'elite* amongst Nepalese recruitment for foreign service, and the terms of service granted them in some manner correspond to their "improved" status as an integral part of the British Army.

In the event the eulogistic terms of the verbal welcome accorded them will certainly be about as gratifying as a slap in the face with a wet fish. For what has, apparently,

already happened? It has been agreed that these men of the British Army should remain on no higher rates of pay and allowances, and be no better equipped than Gurkhas of the Dominion of India Forces, and that no priority in selection of personnel should be given to British recruitment. This latter will certainly mean that the reverse happens, once normal recruitment for replacement commences. It is to be hoped (but not to be expected) that these concessions to Indian feeling will remain valid *only* so long as the selected units remain on Indian soil. Their future destination is already settled, but it is not a particularly salubrious one, and at the present rate of disintegration of the Empire is of exiguous tenure. It does not appear likely that families can accompany units, whereas pre-war percentages will presumably be allowed in the case of the "Indian" Gurkhas.

The chaos over the British officer question is more unaccountable still, and is probably more directly responsible for such minor troubles as have made an appearance in these units more than anything else. It is very generally known in India that the Gurkha is particularly responsive to the influence of officers he knows and trusts and is conservative about changes in such personnel. Nothing could have been simpler once a decision was reached as to which units were "selected" and given the *will* to do the best for them, than to open officer recruitment to all serving and suitable "ex" officers and for a senior committee to select the most suitable volunteers.

Until quite recently, at any rate, these units have not had the faintest idea what the personnel of their future officer cadre was to be, and changes and shortages have been general and constant. This state of affairs appears also to have been mainly due to waiting on Indian convenience in the matter of the officer cadre of non-selected battalions. One of those selected was for some time reduced to three British officers, one at least of whom was of such calibre as to stimulate an exasperated Brigadier to express the opinion that he was a Russian, albeit it must presumably be accepted that this epithet was in the tradition of Dr. Johnson's definition of a virgin. It is believed that at long last steps *have* been taken to make permanent appointments at suitable strength, but meanwhile, many of the most desirable officers have accepted appointment to other arms of the British Service, or chucked their hands in, in weary disgust.

Finally, let us turn to the non-selected units, now part of the Indian forces, and to the considerable Gurkha community domiciled in that Dominion.

One, and so far as one can judge the only, ray of sunshine, seems to be that the Indian authorities really have taken advantage of the delay offered them to select as suitable Indian officers as possible to command and officer Gurkha units. How things will pan out when all British influence is finally removed, it is too early to say; things have not yet shaken down. But it is sensible to remember that those units have been having a very hard time without much respite and in jobs which, at best, they haven't at heart (for instance, internal security duty during the Punjab massacres) and at worst must definitely dislike and resent (for instance, the incurring of

very heavy casualties while protecting the evacuation of Sikh units from Waziristan). In the admirable and outspoken article "The future of the Sikh," which appeared in December's *Eastern World*, the author writes that there was not much love lost between other Indians and the Sikhs. So far as the Gurkha is concerned the dislike is ingrained and both temperamental and historical. A Sikh unit on the move from Waziristan naturally attracts the joyous but unwelcome attention of every tribesman within possible call and heavy fighting was inevitable. It says a very great deal for the Gurkha unit concerned that it took it as it did. Whether it would do so again under purely Indian Command, is another matter. I suggest that any similar experiment is well worth *not trying*. No doubt the strain put on Gurkha units since last August was unavoidable, but it is not a good beginning or consistent with the careful handling I suggested last May was essential if incorporation of Gurkha units into Dominion army was to be a success. Things have not been made easier by the last question we have to examine, that of the domiciled Gurkha community.

In certain districts of India, where Gurkha units have for a century or more had their permanent homes, under Charter, these domiciled communities have achieved considerable size and a good deal of local prestige, if not popularity. Two such districts are Kangra and Kulu valleys, and Dehra Dun, which latter (of all places) has recently been dubbed a "disturbed area" into which European families are advised not to enter. These communities have a close relationship with the local Gurkha units and under the British "raj" undoubtedly exercised a stabilising influence. They are now being "got at" by agitators. The agitation is, at present, in its infancy, and it is not clear exactly what its purpose is, or who are the real instigators. One cannot so far say more than the underlying idea is undoubtedly to unsettle the content of these communities, to make them distrustful of their future, and to set them against any form of existing authority whatsoever; in other words, to stir up trouble for the latter by any possible means. This is, of course, the general first principle of all Communist policy, the activity of the Communist Party in India has increased (underground, mostly) by leaps and bounds lately, and the situation requires most careful watching. It may well, in the not so distant future, have serious repercussions on the relations between India and Nepal. The importance of the latter to India in particular and the world in general is not diminishing, but increasing, and mountains are strategically becoming molehills.

There are curious and disturbing international undercurrents stirring in Tibet and Sinkian, which are probably linked with the more obvious ones in Inner Mongolia. They can have only one origin. Nepal will not, because she cannot, exist in isolation. It is not only India who needs to watch her situation most carefully.

(Since the above article was written it was announced that the eventual composition of the "Gurkha Regiment" (its official title) will be a division of three Brigades, each Brigade comprising one British and two Gurkha Battalions. The 7th Gurkhas are to be converted to artillery. The Division will be maintained as a fighting as distinct from garrison formation.)

THE NEXT PHASE IN CHINA'S CIVIL WAR

by Neil Stewart

ONE autumn day in 1935, 20,000 hard bitten veterans of the Chinese Communist armies arrived in the desolate grass-lands of Shensi, in barren North-West China. They were the survivors of 80,000 troops who had been driven out of Kiangsi, a thousand miles away and, fighting many battles on the way, had marched 5,000 miles by a circular route to arrive at last beyond the reach of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's armies.

In this far away province they prospered, developed their social, economic and military ideas in tune to China's 5,000 years of civilisation. When Japan invaded China they formed a united front with Chiang, fought with him against the Japanese, extending their influence all the time. Competent foreign observers knew that when the war was over China would be too small to hold both Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung. Chiang, while he fought the Japanese with one hand, prepared a show-down with the Communists with the other.

From V.J. day to the middle of 1946, there was an uneasy truce in China. When at last Chiang launched his offensive, there were many who prophesied the final elimination of the Communists. The Kuomintang had at its disposal some two million first-line troops, backed by nearly two million of lesser quality. The U.S. Air Corps obligingly flew thousands to strategic areas in Manchuria and North China. The Soviet Government dutifully handed over to the Kuomintang the towns in Manchuria it had captured from the Japanese. It was generally agreed that Chiang's forces had a flying start.

The first phase of the offensive went well. By January, 1947, Chiang had captured 165 towns and 200,000 square kilometres of territory. American advisors noted, however, that no large bodies of enemy troops had been destroyed, and that territorial gains were heavily paid for; just about half Chiang's first-line troops were put out of action.

The first six months of 1947 saw a gradual change in the balance of power. The Kuomintang armies began to lose more territory and towns than they captured, and their offensive turned to a tactical defensive.

In June, 1947, the Communist armies under General Liu Po-chen, launched an offensive across the Yellow River and penetrated for the first time deep into Kuomintang territory. Their avowed intention was to liberate all China north of the Yangtse River. Chiang had kept the majority of his 248 divisions in the North and in Manchuria, and had left the vital provinces of Central and South China bare. Many of his reserves were out of reach either in the West or the South. A wholesale regrouping of forces was necessary, and, by the time it was finished the Communist troops had reached the Yangtse.

This offensive was by no means an easy victory. The best troops of the Kuomintang have a considerable tradition of military efficiency. They have been trained for

years, firstly by German and later by American military missions, and it is only in the last eighteen months that they have been engaged in really heavy fighting. The Chinese war lords have long been accustomed to send their inferior troops into battle first, and to keep the best for any political eventuality. A million and a half men have been conscripted to replace the heavy battle casualties and desertions, and to-day Formosa teems with troops undergoing their final training. As a purely military force the Kuomintang armies have by no means shot their bolt.

They are equipped with captured Japanese weapons and have received much excellent American material. Estimates put the total American expenditure of all types in Kuomintang China at between three and four billion dollars. A thousand American Army and Navy officers are attached to the forces as advisors and, as in Greece, have considerable influence on the course of operations.

The most serious weakness of Kuomintang China, lies in the political-economic field. The farther the Communist forces advance into Central China the more centrifugal forces develop in the leadership of the Kuomintang. The budgetary deficit is estimated at U.S. \$1,000 millions and the foreign trade deficit at U.S. \$300 millions. Many of the American relief measures have served only to encourage the black market.

But the war in China is by no means ended. Even if Manchuria is abandoned, there are still vast areas in the South and West in which to take refuge. It is, perhaps, for this reason, that Mr. William Bullitt recently advocated, as is believed did General Wedemeyer's unpublished report, the reorganisation of the Kuomintang under American supervision. The South and the West could serve as a base for this purpose. It is doubtful, on the other hand, if all sections of the Kuomintang would agree to complete American control, and equally doubtful if the American tax-payer would be willing to contribute the vast sums this would entail. Another suggested plan is the overthrow of Chiang in favour of a "Third Force" from among the less feudal elements of the Kuomintang.

What of the Communists? To-day they claim to occupy one quarter of the area of China, with a population of 168 million people. Impartial observers admit no doubt that the Communist armies have won considerable victories. Mao Tse-tung's forces are no "popular militia," but tough and experienced troops, well organised and co-ordinated under experienced leaders.

The military organisation is roughly as follows: There are large bodies of regular troops moved from place to place, according to higher strategic needs; local regular troops are used for the defence of a district or province, and a local village militia supports the regular forces, collects information, arranges guides and supplies. Great emphasis is placed on operating inside enemy territory.

The Communists now claim to possess a regular force of two million men, and have a large number of recruits

training in Manchuria. Armament on the communist side is inferior to the Kuomintang, and consists mainly of old Japanese weapons and captured American equipment.

The militia and local regular troops carry out guerrilla and harassing tactics against the enemy, and occasional "mobile" operations against defined objectives. Mao emphasises the need to use the vast plains and mountains of China for manoeuvre. "The main objective," he said in a recent speech, "is the annihilation of the enemy's fighting forces, not the retention or capture of cities and places." For this reason many of the big cities, such as Kirin, Peiping and others still remain in Kuomintang hands, although within a mile or two of their defences the agrarian policy of the Liberated Areas is being put into practice.

The present success of the communist-led armies cannot be put down to purely military victories. The Communists have balanced their programme to meet the economic desires of the Chinese peasants. The main item of the programme is agrarian reform, and the arrival of the Communist power in an area is followed by the distribution of the land among the peasants and the cancellation of past debts. The landlord, once the backbone of the Kuomintang, now finds himself on a level of equality with the other peasants. This is a powerful argument which the Kuomintang, with its promise of constitutional democracy at a later date and no actual change in property relations, can find little to counter.

The middle class is appeased by the encouragement

of small-scale trade and industry, and by the nationalisation of big business. Many foreigners, particularly those who have worked for U.N.R.R.A., have praised the frugal lives of the Communist administrators, and the manner in which the state apparatus weighs less heavily upon the people than in the Kuomintang areas.

Latest reports from China say that small parties of Communist troops have crossed the Yangtse, operate in the neighbourhood of Nanking and reconnoitre into South China. It would seem that, despite the changes in military leadership and the many military conferences held this year by Chiang Kai-shek, the strategic initiative is in the hands of the Communists, although the Kuomintang is still capable of considerable tactical efforts, as was shown by the operations around Chefoo and the mopping-up campaign in the Taipeih mountain area.

Chiang suffers from a shortage of troops, not so much as a result of his losses, but because he has neglected the military principle of concentration of force. By trying to be strong on every battlefield, he finally finds his armies numerically weak at the important points. From Manchuria to the Yangtse he holds most of the big towns and important lines of communication. The offensive in Central China faces him with the alternative of abandoning Manchuria and bringing the troops to reinforce the central front, or of being out-numbered in that area. Perhaps the Kuomintang troops at present finishing their training in Formosa will alter the balance, but, for the moment, the situation is dominated by the expected Communist offensive into South China.

RECONSTRUCTION IN MALAYA (2)

by A. T. Newbould, C.M.G., M.C., E.D.

(Chief Secretary, Malayan Union)

WHEN the British returned to Malaya in the autumn of 1945 we were faced with many new and difficult problems, many of which are still only partially solved to-day. We found suspicion and blood feuds between the local communities in place of racial harmony; universal malnutrition with all the consequences which flow from it; complete absence of every article normally imported; thousands of rural families almost naked, restricting school attendance and handicapping agriculture; widespread unemployment; we found a Japanese currency of four thousand million dollars against a pre-war average circulation of just over two hundred million dollars; wholesale disintegration of moral standards, and a prevailing state of ignorance or distortion of facts relating to the war only possible in a country where the truth was too dangerous to be published.

Of all the evil legacies of the Japanese, one of those which called for the most urgent and widespread attention was public health. Hospitals had used up the drugs and stores left by us in 1942, where these were not taken by the Japanese for the use of their military forces, and thereafter received practically nothing in the way of new supplies. Malnutrition had its effect in all sections of the community, but especially amongst the poor.

Health control had been seriously relaxed by the Japanese authorities. Malaria had always been the scourge of the country, but due to the success of our scientists, the skill of engineers and the expenditure of large sums of money, Malaya had so reduced this serious menace that before the war malaria no longer headed the list of fatal diseases. In one district the figures of fresh infections speak for themselves: In 1938 it was fifty-seven; in 1939 it fell to twenty, and in 1942, it rose to five hundred and twenty-one. On re-occupation not only malaria control, but all the multifarious health measures in urban and rural areas had to be re-established to avoid any serious outbreak of disease. Pulmonary tuberculosis, which is the next most serious disease in Malaya, is more prevalent than before the war, though it is not yet possible to estimate its incidence with any degree of accuracy.

To all practical purposes education ceased during the period of occupation, though rural schools did remain open and teaching of a sort was continued. The teaching of English was rigorously suppressed, teaching of Japanese was added to the syllabus; there was a most serious defection of teaching staff as teachers of all races were the victims of Japanese attack in their elimination of dangerous elements in the civil population. On our return,

we were faced by this gap of four years, the occupation of many school premises for other purposes, the loss of books and furniture, and a vast surging clamour for greater and improved educational facilities from all sections of the community. The problem is vast. The educational plan has been recast, not merely to make good the losses occasioned by the war, but to build up a progressive system of education for boys and girls of both village and town, from vernacular education to secondary and university education to fit them for the part they have to play in the future of Malaya.

Progress in other departments has varied according to the amount of destruction which took place during the period of enemy occupation and the speed with which supplies were forthcoming. From the very beginning regular road and rail services were re-established on an increasing programme; the larger towns had electrical power; postal, telephone and telegraph services resumed at a very early date and within a few months the country settled down to a semblance of its former life.

True, there were many serious difficulties. It took some time to re-establish any appearance of law and order. The police force had been more demoralised than any other service of government. The Japanese military and secret police had, to a great extent, operated through the former police services to the serious detriment to the morale of that force. During the early months there were the inevitable charges of collaboration to be sifted, and those against whom there was the evidence were brought to trial in special courts set up for the purpose. A considerable proportion of the male population, and in some cases, women and children, had been displaced by the Japanese (thousands were taken away to do forced labour either in distant parts of Malaya, Borneo or Siam, and many thrown out of work), or had fled to the jungle where they maintained themselves as either regular or irregular guerrilla bands. On our return, their occupation was gone, there were large stores of arms and ammunition lying scattered all over the country and the temptation of using robbery and extortion as easier methods of earning a livelihood than labour in the field or office.

Before the war rice was plentiful and cheap. Two-thirds came from abroad, either Siam or Burma. In spite of the very active steps taken to increase local production, it was not possible to raise the figure above one-third of total consumption. On our return in September, 1945, rice was neither plentiful, nor cheap. Disruption of communications with the producing countries, the drop in production in those countries, the failure of the attempts of the Japanese to maintain, let alone increase local production all contributed to a rice famine in the country, to rocketing prices, and to an active black market. As rice is the staple food of the population it is the yard stick for wages, and, consequently, the economy of the country was seriously upset. In addition, the shortage produced deficiencies in nutrition which affected the health of the people. To help to bridge the gap, wheat was imported in considerable supplies, but even this was reduced in view of the world shortage of wheat. Every effort has been made to popularise wheat, but there are limits to the extent to which any country will, in a matter of two years, change its basic diet.

In actual fact, imports of rice in 1946 were 23 per cent. of requirements, and with local production falling to 20 per cent., the total availabilities were only 43 per cent. of the amount of rice required to maintain the pre-war level of consumption. The rationing of the available supplies has produced more headaches than any other single problem when consideration is given to the varying requirements of the community, such as heavy labour whose strength has to be maintained in the general interest, the distribution of rice in rice growing areas, the effect of any measure on the production of local rice, and the danger, in an Asiatic country, of purchasing all rice supplies in the hands of producers, who have not forgotten the ways of Japanese administrators and their forceful sequestration of any rice on which they could lay their hands, without compensation. The question shows little signs of immediate improvement, and Malaya must look forward to a permanent re-adjustment of her economy to adapt it to the changed conditions in the rice world. It is clear that there can be no return to the cheap wages of pre-war days. Supplies of general consumer goods are improving steadily and they are exercising a stabilising force. But a solution which would have more effect than any other in balancing the forces of costs and wages, is an increase in the supply of rice at a reasonable price.

In the opinion of many best qualified to judge, we would have avoided many of our troubles ending in serious strikes and in some cases in open clashes with authority, had we been able to feed and clothe the labour population in anything like an adequate manner. The restless condition of labour after the war was aggravated by the conditions under which it had lived and worked in the Japanese occupation. On our return it was undernourished and the vast majority were not in a physical condition to undertake a full day's heavy work. Workers had lost the habit of regular work and fixed hours and the standards to which they had been accustomed had vanished. Living accommodation had been seriously neglected or damaged; their amenities had gone.

On our re-occupation we found in existence a body which called itself the General Labour Union. This body opened premises in all the larger towns in Malaya: its aims and objects were largely political. It strove to gain and exercise control in all labour matters, laying down the pattern for others to follow. Just before the Japanese occupation, legislation had been introduced to provide for the registration and supervision of trade unions, but the war intervened before it could be operated. On our return steps were taken to implement its provisions, a registrar was appointed and an officer with considerable trade union experience in Great Britain, was appointed as trade union adviser. His functions are to advise and assist in the formation and running of unions and, though he works in close touch with the commissioner for Labour and the Registrar of Trade Unions, he is independent of them. Up to date four hundred and twenty-seven unions have been registered with a total membership of 273,977, while more applications are awaiting approval of rules before registration.

Singapore before the war handled a very considerable part of the export and import trade of the Malay Peninsula, but the economy of the island itself is largely

dependent on *entrepôt* trade between the surrounding countries and world markets. The work of rehabilitating the port rapidly progressed and there was a remarkable trade recovery as a result, so that by the end of 1946 the capital value of Singapore's trade exceeded one thousand million dollars. This was a creditable achievement despite an amount of labour trouble and a three-week strike of dock workers in November of that year.

In the Malay Peninsula it was found that the damage to rubber estates was less than was anticipated, although the labour forces were very sadly depleted as a result of the compulsory transfer of thousands of Indian workers for the construction of the notorious Siamese railway. The problem was tackled energetically and with the return from recuperative leave of many planters who had been interned by the Japanese, the production of rubber and latex rose rapidly and soon exceeded the average monthly figure for the record year of 1941.

Two Burmese Characters

by John Dobie

WITH news of the Independence of Burma, my memory is jogged back nearly four years ago, when as a member of the late General Wingate's "Chindits," I found myself plodding through the northern part of that strange country.

In an expedition which abounded in colourful characters of various nationalities, two, in particular, linger in my mind, both of them natives of the country.

Maung Saw made his appearance in the ranks of our column one day shortly after we had had a brush with the little yellow men. He had been in their pay and was captured by one of our recon patrols. His knowledge of the methods and peculiarities of the "Nips," as well as of the particular area we were operating in, no doubt saved him from the fate usually reserved for spies.

In appearance he was slim and wiry, with bright intelligent eyes and a twisted engaging grin on his lips. He spoke little English, but when conversing in his native tongue his voice was soft and musical. His dress consisted solely of the traditional Burmese skirt, twisted round his middle, the folds falling to his knees. Its colour was a vivid green. At subsequent supply drops, however, he gradually acquired a wardrobe, and in a few weeks was snappily attired in a regulation jungle-green battledress, complete with bush hat, boots and American carbine. He did not appear incongruous in this outfit, and presented a neat and tidy appearance which he obviously took great pains to preserve.

On occasion he would dress himself in his green skirt and disappear into the nearest village, re-appearing later to make his report to the O.C. No doubt Maung Saw incurred some personal risks on these visits, but it was difficult for us to imagine his being trapped by his former employers. His confident bearing and general *sang froid*

The tin industry suffered more grievously than did that of rubber owing to the destruction of dredges and all types of machinery at the hands of the retreating British Army in 1941-42, or their removal by Japanese or by looters. Delay in obtaining essential machinery has slowed down the rehabilitation of this industry.

Malaya is a land of great achievements in the past and great possibilities in the future. Now she stands, after emerging from the fire of Japanese tyranny, with her old traditions of freedom and tolerance still firmly rooted. The many communities, with their divergent cultures, religions and manners of life, must cultivate one common interest in the future welfare of the country, and from our experience in the past and present we are entitled to hope that those whose affection and loyalty lies in the Federation will see that the common welfare is assured. The foundations which have been laid during the last hundred years still survive to support the structure which future generations will build.

seemed to us to render him immune to the more frightful aspects of jungle warfare, and in a measure his nonchalant self-confidence communicated itself to the rest of the column.

I believe as a reward for his valuable services he was promised the post of headman of his native village. I can only say he deserved the honour. Maung Saw remained with us throughout the long, arduous months, until we finally returned to India.

Later on we picked up another ex-Jap collaborator. I never knew his real name, but he was christened "Willie," and "Willie" he remained during his brief stay with the column. Facially, he resembled a much battered and dissipated negro prizefighter, for he was an opium addict. He was also retained merely for his specialised knowledge. Almost every night, after a day's march, "Willie" would light a small fire and, crouching over it, produce his ball of opium, which he placed in a small tin and heated over the flames. This ceremony took quite a while, but finally he produced a long pipe into which he stuffed the prepared opium, and then lay back, puffing contentedly. Gradually he lapsed into a stupor, a blissful smile on his unprepossessing features, and babbled incessantly.

On the march the following day, after one of these bouts, he looked to be in the last stages of exhaustion, but appearances were deceptive in his case, for he lasted the pace quite easily. Later on he took his leave of us, no doubt suitably rewarded.

I wonder how these two diverse types are faring in the new political set-up. Is the clever, ambitious Maung Saw lording it over the happy carefree people of his village? Is Willie, the opium addict still indulging in his pipe-dreams?

FROM ALL QUARTERS

Brunei Administration

Various administrative changes, which will in no way alter the status and powers of the Sultan or its position as a State under British protection, are to be carried out shortly in Brunei. On the amalgamation, under Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, of the posts of Governor-General, Malaya, and of Special Commissioner for South East Asia, the Governor of Sarawak will assume the office of High Commissioner for Brunei. As such he will exercise the same powers as were exercised before the war by the Governor and High Commissioner at Singapore. Under the new arrangement Mr. MacDonald will have the same relationship to Brunei as he will have to the Federation of Malaya and the Colonies of Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo, while the British Resident, Brunei, will remain under the authority of the High Commissioner for Brunei and will retain the same powers as he now exercises.

The heads of certain Sarawak technical departments, e.g., the Education, Health, Public Works and Agriculture Departments, will act in an advisory capacity to The Sultan regarding their respective subjects. This will assist in meeting the wish of the authorities and people of Brunei for improved education and other services. Colonial Service officers on the Sarawak Establishment will be seconded for service with the Brunei Administration in the same way as such officers on the Malayan Establishment are now seconded. Brunei will continue to have its own budget as before, and will pay the Sarawak Government for the services rendered in the same way as it now does for the services of officers in the Brunei Administration who are on the Malayan Establishment.

Australian Scholarships for S.E. Asia

The Australian Government have allocated £90,000 for educational reconstruction work in India, Pakistan, Burma, Malaya, China, the Philippines and Indonesia. Of this, £60,000 are earmarked for scholarships and the rest for the purchase of educational supplies for these countries. An additional £5,000 have been set aside for assistance to other countries in S.E. Asia, such as Siam.

Nepal Constitution

Maharaja Padma Shumshere Jung Bahadur, the hereditary Prime Minister of Nepal, has now promulgated a Constitution for that Himalayan kingdom. It is based upon the recommendations of a Reforms Committee which were submitted in May last year, and incorporates almost all the civil rights enjoyed by the citizens of a modern democratic state. Further Nepalese reforms will include the annual publication of a scientific budget, the increase of educational institutions and the creation of an independent judiciary.

North Borneo Reconstruction

Reviewing the activities during 1947, at the opening session of the Crown Colony's Advisory Council, the Governor recalled that, before the war, there had been

890 Government buildings including European and Asiatic quarters, medical buildings, schools, offices, barracks and stores. Of these 614 were destroyed and 266 damaged. In addition the roads had been ruined; the railway was out of order and rolling stock had either been removed, destroyed or damaged, and the wharves and harbour facilities had been put out of action. Since then 197 temporary buildings had been erected and 56 had been repaired. Temporary repairs had been affected to 235 miles of road and permanent repairs to five miles of road, but this work was seriously held up by lack of road making equipment. The bulk of the railway track had been put in order and a skeleton service was being run.

The water supplies had been made to operate in most cases and an electrical supply had been provided for Jesselton and Labuan. Temporary wharves had been built in most of the ports. The cost of all this Public Works Department programme to date had been approximately \$3,450,000.

Junagadh Accession

The U.N. Security Council recently dealt with the dispute between India and Pakistan concerning the accession of Junagadh and other small Kathiawar States to India. While Kashmir has a predominantly Moslem population with a Hindu ruler, Junagadh is mostly Hindu with a Moslem ruler. The dispute arose as a result of the latter's declared intention of joining his State to Pakistan. Mr. Ayyanger, the Indian representative, told the Council that a plebiscite had already been held in Junagadh with an overwhelming vote for India, but Sir M. Zafrullah Khan, for Pakistan, charged that the plebiscite had not been conducted fairly. The Indian Government, it is understood, is willing to hold another plebiscite, this time under United Nations auspices, if so decided by the Security Council. The result of the referendum, announced on 24th February showed a virtually unanimous decision in favour of India. Indian sources insist that secrecy of the ballot was scrupulously observed and freedom of voting ensured, and that every polling booth was supervised by a committee consisting of both Hindus and Muslims. It may be recalled that on 9th November, 1947, India took over the administration of Junagadh State in response to a request made by the Nawab of Junagadh and his Dewan, Mr. Bhutto. The Government of India, however, made it plain that the final question of the accession of Junagadh to India or Pakistan would be decided by the people of the State in a free and open referendum. The result of the voting was as follows:

	Entitled to vote.	Muslims.	Non- Muslims.	Votes for India.	Votes for Pakistan.
Junagadh ...	200,569	21,606	178,963	190,779	91
Nabavadar ...	8,680	520	8,160	8,436	11
Bantwa (Bara) ...	1,427	249	1,178	1,091	10
Bantwa (Chota) ...	1,432	39	1,393	1,412	—
Sardargarh Taluka ...	3,393	231	3,162	3,241	2
Babariawad ...	5,880	243	5,637	5,392	8
Mangrol ...	12,997	—	—	11,833	8

(The number of voters on the electoral rolls in the community separately are not available.)

LONDON NOTEBOOK

Telephone Call for Ch. \$1,746,000

A radio-telephone service between Britain and China has been opened this month. At its inauguration, Mr. K. C. Wu, Mayor of Shanghai, conveyed the greetings of his city to the people of London. Sir Frank Newsom Smith, President of the London Chamber of Commerce replied, expressing his belief that the new service would play a great part in future trade relations between the two countries. The Chinese Ambassador Dr. F. T. Cheng, speaking in Chinese, conveyed his personal greetings to Mayor Wu, and praised the usefulness of the new communication. Although the radio-telephone has two circuits, only one of them will be used at first and is in operation between 9.30 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. London time (5.30 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. Shanghai time). At present there is direct communication only between all points in the British Isles at the one end and Shanghai and Nanking at the other. Charges are in Britain £3 for three minutes, and in China 36 gold francs or Ch. \$1,746,000 at the current rate of exchange. At the Chinese end ten English-speaking Chinese telephone operators will look after the service. The same personnel serves on the radio telephone service between China and the United States.

Freedom of Press Conference

Dr. Yui Ming, Director of the Chinese Government Information Office, London, is Advisor to his country's delegation at the U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information which begins on March 29th and will probably last a month.

Dr Yui, who took up his present appointment last summer has had experience of press work. A former member of the editorial board of *Tien Hsia Monthly*, he became director of

the Pacific Coast Chinese Information Office in San Francisco immediately after Pearl Harbour and later took over the Chinese Information Office in Toronto.

U.K. Civil Aviation Representative

Group Captain R. J. Bone, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., has been appointed U.K. Civil Aviation Representative in the Far East. He will also hold the position of Civil Air Attaché to the British Embassies at Nanking and Bangkok, but his residence is at Hong Kong.

Secret Society of China

At a meeting of the China Society and Universities' China Committee, Mr. William Sterling gave a talk on Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya. He traced their origin back to the early days when Chinese immigrants, as complete strangers, found living conditions extremely difficult and formed various secret organisations which, at a later date, excelled in extortion, robbery and murder. As a civil servant of the Straits Settlement Government, it was part of Mr. Sterling's duty to help in the suppression of these organisations. His department concerned itself exclusively with Chinese civil and criminal matters, and he thus acquired a considerable knowledge of Chinese customs, folklore, occult beliefs and organisations. It seems a pity that Mr. Sterling was unable to choose from his wealth of experience only those items which would have interested the audience most.

Siamese Art Exhibition

A most successful function was the reception given by the Siamese Ambassador and Madame Nai Direck Jayanama at their Embassy on the occasion of the opening of a Siamese Art Exhibition. The Ambassador explained that this was the first exhibition of its kind outside Siam, but predicted the holding of a bigger one in the future. Exhibits, which include sculptures and paintings, originals as well as reproductions, representing the various periods and schools, were explained by Prof. Silpa Bhirasri, foremost expert of Siam's art, in great

detail. Dr. R. le May, one time Adviser to the Siamese Government, took this opportunity of paying a warm and genuine tribute to the high qualities of the Siamese people.

Farewell Luncheon

The China Society gave a luncheon party to Miss Lynda Grier, British Council Representative in Peking, who is to leave London early in April. Ambassador F. T. Cheng in the chair, thought that Miss Grier, as a woman, would have special opportunity of contacting the women of China who are now playing an ever increasing part in their country's political, social and cultural activities. Miss Grier said that from her earliest youth China and all it stood for had had the utmost fascination for her. She felt confident that the work which lay before her would contribute towards cultural exchanges between China and Britain. She was looking forward to taking up the link with scholars, artists and poets, as the true love of learning was essential for the promotion of mutual understanding between the two countries.

Order of St. John

Sir Reginald Hugh Dorman-Smith, P.C., G.B.E., late Governor of Burma, was recently invested with the insignia of a Knight of Grace at an investiture held by the Venerable Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem.

Chinese Film in London

The Barber Takes a Wife is a Chinese film which has just reached London and which promises to be a great success in this country. At a preview, I was impressed with the excellent photography, the delightful acting and the unpretentious simplicity of the comedy. A merchant in need of money persuades No. 3, a poor barber, to masquerade as a rich man and to answer an advertisement for a husband inserted by "an heiress to an immense fortune." The "heiress" is as poor as No. 3, and the delightful situations arising from this plot are fully exploited and often reach a level of nearly Chaplinesque height.

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BOOKS ON THE

by Kenneth Grenville Myer

THE CHINESE IN MALAYA by Victor Purcell, C.M.G., claims to be the first history of this subject, and what a fine piece of work it is. Apart from certain unimportant omissions which the author himself is at pains to point out, this book is a comprehensive study of the "Black-Haired Race" in exile—an exile which was always voluntary and may now be regarded as permanent. Dr. Purcell makes it clear that the Chinese in Malaya have come to stay; they must be regarded as a permanent feature of a mixed population, and they will remain a majority in most States of the Federation. If there were any doubt still remaining in the mind of Whitehall that the Chinese, not merely on account of their numbers, but because of their history and achievements, have as much right to be regarded as citizens as the indigenous Malay peoples, this book would dispel it. The existence of a cleavage between the races must be acknowledged. What hope there is for Malaya lies in the growth of mutual confidence between the several races which make up its population. Racial distrust is an evil thing. It could easily wreck the hopes of those responsible for the new Federation. Those who seek a full understanding of some of the issues involved could do no better than brief themselves from this book on those affecting the Chinese.

Quite apart from its intrinsic merits this book is a model to all those who are producing a text-book. On several occasions I have had to point out *lacunae* in the reference books I have reviewed in these columns. Important works have fallen short of perfection by an accidental or deliberate lack of consideration for the reader. One book lacked a map, another a bibliography, a third carried an index which was ornamental rather than useful, while a fourth would have doubled its value had appendices on certain side-issues been included. No such criticism can be levelled at this production. The maps, index and bibliography are all that they should be; the appendices on the Baba language and the statistical tables are excellent amplifications of the main text, and the foot-notes are never allowed to get out of hand.

We are told we can look forward to the appearance of further volumes dealing with the Chinese in other overseas areas. If they are of the same high standard as this the Chinese could ask for no better historian. As "Modern Malaya is in the main the joint creation of British and Chinese enterprise," so **THE CHINESE IN MALAYA** appears under the joint auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and the Institute of Pacific Relations; a felicitous combination for which the public, no less than Dr. Purcell, have every reason to be grateful.

And now we find ourselves dipping into **JAVA REVISITED** by Johan Fabricius. And after such a dip there is nothing like a good rub-down with a rough towel. Mr. Fabricius tells us in his second paragraph that he had to wait in Ceylon for his credentials as a war-correspondent

FAR EAST

of S.E.A.C., whose headquarters, he states, were in New Delhi—and this at the beginning of September, 1945. One cannot but wonder what all those high-ranking officers were doing kicking their heels in Kandy, so remote from what Mr. Fabricius obviously believed to be the centre of things. Such a misstatement on the first page casts a little cloud, no bigger than the author's page-proofs, on what facts Mr. Fabricius can bring himself to reveal in the rest of the book. Later on Mr. Fabricius describes the European houses on the Kramat Road, where "White women and children were sitting within with beating hearts listening and waiting." We should find this a little more worthy of record had the hearts of the listening women stopped beating altogether! Now this really won't do at all. Mr. Fabricius is a distinguished novelist, and he more than anyone else might be expected to know his subject, and to expound it in a style which is neither unbearably maudlin nor merely silly. Perhaps I am being unfair to Mr. Fabricius, perhaps these "beating hearts," these "rapacious hands," these "emaciated bodies," and the countless other clichés which embellish these pages like a rash of measles are not his work at all but that of his translator, M. S. Stephens. I do not know, I am not able to compare this edition with the original. Nevertheless, I predict with confidence that lovers of Mr. Fabricius will be disappointed in this book; those who are not will wonder how it came to be published.

RETURN VIA RANGOON by Philip Stibbe has a foreword by Frank Owen, the editor of the *London Daily*

Mail. This is not the place to record his share in keeping the morale of the fighting men of the Fourteenth Army high, nor the efforts he has made to place their glorious achievements under Admiral Mountbatten and General Sir William Slim in the right perspective against the more frequently publicised accounts of the successes of the Armies of the West. The task of this great army—at one time having more mouths to feed than any other army in the world—was stupendous. The vast distances, the incredibly difficult terrain, disease, the difference of race between the opposing forces, all these combined to make the path to victory immeasurably difficult. Inevitably there had to be pathfinders. Mr. Stibbe was one of them. As a junior officer in "Wingate's Circus" he pioneered along the route until, wounded, he was captured by the Japanese, tortured, and then held captive in Rangoon Jail. No more realistic picture could be painted of the day-to-day routine of training, fighting, and captivity than this. A junior officer is particularly well-placed to give it. He has no broad strategical view, but makes up for it by being close enough to see "What it is really like." Mr. Stibbe is possessed of an easy style and is able to pass his knowledge on to us untarnished. This account of the late Major-General Wingate's first expedition in 1943 is dedicated to Rifleman Maung Tun, the Burma Rifles, who gave his life that the author might live, and is a tribute to the self-sacrifice of all, Indian, Gurkha, Burmese, and British who were prepared to prove that victory was possible across the Chindwin.

BOOKS REVIEWED

THE CHINESE IN MALAYA by Victor Purcell. (Oxford University Press, 18s.).

JAVA REVISITED by Johan Fabricius. (Heinemann, 9s. 6d.).

RETURN VIA RANGOON by Philip Stibbe. (Newman Wolsey, 9s. 6d.).

THE ETERNAL PARADOX

by Shusheila Lal

SNOWBALLS OF GARHWAL, Edited by Dr. D. N. Majumdar (Universal Publishers, Lucknow, Rs. 3-12.).

FIELD SONGS OF CHHATTISGARH, Edited by Dr. D. N. Majumdar (Universal Publishers, Lucknow, Rs. 3-12.).

BHAGAVAD-GITA, Translated by Prabhavananda and Isherwood (Phoenix House, 6s.).

TAKEN together, the *BHAGAVAD-GITA* and the folk songs of the people represent, very adequately, the paradox inherent in Indian life. On the one hand there is the austerity of contemplative thought, and on the other an intense delight in the abundance of nature and of fancy. The motif of art in India, and especially of folk art, is multiplicity, variety, fecundity. But the Hindu religion is a product of the philosophic imagination, which seeks to comprehend all things, but always to press beyond their bewildering appearances to a steady vision of the whole in which they are reconciled. Yet this paradox is, in a sense, more obvious than real. It is perfectly natural that where the impact of life is most vivid and multitudinous, the impulse to make sense of it, to somehow weld it into harmony, once felt, should flourish most vigorously. *SNOWBALLS OF GARHWAL* and *FIELD SONGS OF CHHATTISGARH*, both edited by Dr. D. N. Majumdar, are collections of folk song and legend from two so called backward parts of India. They are the expression of cultures, comparatively untroubled by knowledge of the outside world, yet by no means secure or sheltered. Nor

is it immediately apparent that however different these tribal cultures may be from any that prevail in the larger world, the stuff of human experience is the same, the sadness of exile, the bitter sweet reflections of the bride, the fickleness of man or woman, the harshness or loveliness of nature: of such are they composed. What is rare in them, perhaps, is a certain plainness of speech, and the scenery to which constant reference is made, in one case the mountains and in the other forest and plain. The illustrations by L. M. Sen have strength as well as charm. But we are not allowed to take our pleasures simply. Both books begin with rather pedantic introductions, in which the reader is instructed to take an anthropological interest in what follows, an interest which appears to vary in attitude between the patronising and the awe-struck.

The *BHAGAVAD-GITA*, as translated by Christopher Isherwood and Swami Prabhavananda, comes with a new persuasiveness. They have rid it of the quaintness and stiltedness of phrase, which prevailed in the older translations. In this form it is easy to read, and leaves one with a sense at once of tremendous drama and of

persistent argument. The drama is that of the soul of Arjun struggling for enlightenment on the eve of battle against his kinsmen. Face to face with them he is assailed by conscientious doubt, and turns in horror from the idea of bloodshed. But the argument which Krishna, in the guise of his charioteer, employs to convince him of his duty goes far beyond the terms of this particular situation. It is a steady appeal to the mind to expand beyond the moment, and beyond the terms of earthbound existence to a point whence hesitation and doubt have no validity. Arjun, in his unhappiness, shows a willingness to listen, so Krishna continues with his instruction. Suddenly Arjun is convinced, both of the argument and of the divinity of its source, and breaks into worship. Thereupon Krishna reveals himself more fully and then assuages Arjun's terror by returning to his original guise and resuming his discourse. Within this framework of story lies a concentration of the findings of Hindu sages over a very long period. As Aldous Huxley has pointed out in his introduction to this volume, the Bhagavad-Gita "combines the poetical qualities of scripture with the clear cut methodicalness of theology." Beginning with a discussion of the problem of action, one is immediately initiated into the way in which the point of view of the mystic diverges from that of the worldly. Arjun would like to abjure action, which brings such hateful consequences in its train, but Krishna reminds him that not to act at this moment would result in social confusion and a bewilderment in the minds of many people, which could be nothing but harmful. It is possible, he says, to achieve union with God purely by contemplation, but action too may be used as a means to the same end, if it is entered into without desire and without hope of gain. There is no suggestion here that apart from its effect on the individual soul, the external world might be improved by action or inaction, that in fact Arjun's stand for pacifism might benefit the bad old world. But the reason for this is obvious. To Krishna, past and future are as one. Historical events could have no separate

importance, neither war, nor pacifism. The one point of significance was the establishment of the true relation between the individual and the whole, in fact, the mystical identity. "There was never a time," says Krishna, "when I did not exist, nor you, nor any of these Kings. Nor is there any future in which we shall cease to be. Just as the dweller in the body passes through childhood, youth and old age, so at death he merely passes into another kind of body. The wise are not deceived by this."

There are many intermediate stages of worship, all of which are acceptable within their limitations. Those who practise austerity, for example, are rewarded by the achievement of self-control. Thus, individuals are developed by worship, but devotion to intermediate forms of good becomes ultimately a barrier to further development, since the inevitable result of worship is to become more and more absorbed in the object of reverence. Krishna does not demand undue austerity or knowledge of the scriptures. It is a certain wholeness of realisation, or love, which results in the final union with God, and it is the discriminating individual, who refuses to be satisfied with the lesser forms of good, who comes to this end. The world as it appears to the unenlightened, is caught in the toils of action, from which there seems no escape, because even renunciation is a form of action. The basic elements which compose this world are forever forming and re-forming in new and apparently meaningless combinations, but within this flux is the struggle for God realisation, which is the dawning, as it were, of meaning. Through the cultivation of self-control and discrimination one may, at length, come to realise the point of stillness which lies within oneself, and is identical with the essential stillness of the unchanging universe. And when this is achieved the cycle of finite being is brought to an end.

The Bhagavad-Gita, as thus presented to us, is an extraordinarily lucid account of an extraordinarily unanswerable argument regarding the nature of the Universe. It is also a delightful piece of literature.

POST WAR JAPAN

by G. S. Hudson

THE PHOENIX CUP. By John Morris. (Cresset Press, 12/6.)

MR. JOHN MORRIS'S book might equally well have been entitled "Return to Japan." The experience of returning to a country well-known, yet strangely different, is the main theme of the book. The difference is first of all in the aspect of Japanese cities. "It is useless," says the writer, "to think in terms of destruction as we came to know it in Europe; you have to give a new meaning to the word." Most of Tokyo he found a "sea of ashes, rubble and rusted cans," and in the suburb of Shibuya he searched for the place where his own house had been when he lived in Japan before the war. Digging in the ashes he found a little sake cup, and from this he took the title for his book, for it was "a symbol of the phoenix, a reminder that underneath the present chaos and destruction there are civilised virtues in the Japanese which, if we desire peace for that country, we must help to revive."

This excellent sentiment provides the key to an understanding of some strange contradictions which emerge in the course of Mr. Morris's book. He wants to reform Japan—or more specifically to democratise it—and as a journalist he critically observes the efforts of General MacArthur's Headquarters, with the Allied Council and the Far Eastern Commission in the background, to perform just this task. He is unable to feel that they are being very successful; he has had too much experience of Japan to be convinced by the supple adaptation of the Japanese to the will of the conqueror. He speaks of the failure of the American Occupation authorities to "appreciate that strict attention to the terms of Allied directives does not necessarily indicate a change of heart." It is the change of heart which interests Mr. Morris and he does not find much of it. How is it to be brought about? Mr. Morris sees that directives handed down from Allied

Headquarters only determine outward forms and do not shape the inner thoughts of the Japanese people; he admits the difficulty of gaining Japanese devotion for a Constitution which is universally known in Japan to have been "prepared in the legal department of Allied Headquarters" and was clumsily translated into Japanese from English. But, when it comes to his own proposals for reforming Japan, Mr. Morris falls into even greater absurdities. He not only approves the American banning of certain *Kabuki* plays which are held to inculcate militarist and authoritarian sentiments, but would go so far as to close the *Kabukiza* theatre altogether because even themes which appear harmless "have an implied emphasis on revenge and loyalty." He appears unable to understand that the suppression of a popular national drama by a foreign decree (even if transmitted through a Japanese Government unable to resist) cannot be, in Japanese eyes, anything but a cultural persecution against which national feeling is bound to react with a morbid intensity in the long run. The British military authorities in Germany at one time attempted a general ban on Wagner, but this method of curing the Germans of nationalism was, fortunately, soon abandoned, and it is curious that Mr. Morris should think that the Japanese can be converted into pacific, internationalist democrats by forbidding them to see the story of Yoshitsune and Benkei acted on the stage.

What will endure in Japan of democratic reform and reconstruction is what comes from the Japanese themselves by their own thought and will. Puppet dictators can be imposed on a country from outside by foreign military conquest, but democracy cannot be, for democracy is essentially self-government, and there is a basic contradiction between self-government and direction by peremptory commands from above, even when they come from so modest and diffident a person as General MacArthur. Nor are the general behaviour and way of living of the Occupation forces in Japan, as described by Mr. Morris in his book, conducive to the transmission to the Japanese of the higher values of Western civilisation. The opulence of the victors in a devastated and poverty-stricken country is no doubt a natural consequence of a bitter war, but it is hardly the way to impress on the Japanese ideas of the dignity of the common man or the inherent wickedness of the military profession, and Mr. Morris confesses to feeling "uncomfortable" when the luxury train reserved for

Occupation personnel drew into a station and "one could see on other platforms the wretched Japanese waiting in pens like sheep."

The greatest service of the Allies to the cause of democracy in Germany and Japan has indeed been in their actual military victory and not in any of the subsequent experiments in "re-education." Nothing fails like failure, and the Japanese militarists have been deeply discredited by defeat. The Japanese have taken a terrific beating, not only in the field, but in their own cities which have been destroyed from the air. Their future rulers would certainly think twice before trying another Pearl Harbour, even if they had the means, and they are not likely to have the means for a long time to come, for Japan has been thoroughly disarmed—and can be kept so as long as America has the will to do it—and deprived of all her overseas strategic bases and sources of raw material. American power can further be used to protect the new regime in Japan against violent overthrow either from without or from within. But beyond that, the less interference in Japanese national life, the better it will be. The "change of heart" must come from the Japanese themselves; we can hope for it, but cannot enforce it. In any case the victors are morally in sorry shape for democratising Japan, when the Japanese are informed of the subversion of democracy in Czechoslovakia and hear at the same time Russian denunciations of American "imperialism" in terms almost identical with those of Japanese war-time propaganda.

In spite of its inconsistencies of exhortation, Mr. Morris has written a very vivid and readable traveller's account of post-war Japan, full of revealing anecdotes and glimpses of the everyday life of the people. Perhaps the most astonishing item in the fare is the story of the American-sponsored beauty competition in Nagasaki, at which a girl was chosen as "Miss Atom Bomb, 1946." Nobody likes to incur the charge of lacking a sense of humour, but many people both in this country and America will probably feel horrified at such a frivolity in a city where many thousands of men, women and children were killed, mutilated or blinded by an atomic explosion less than three years ago. It is a reminder that the malady of our time goes deeper than the surface problems of politics and economics.

TOKYO CHIT CHAT

from our Correspondent in Japan — John Murdoch

DOLLARS FOR JAPAN

While welcoming the U.S.A. plan to underwrite a comprehensive rehabilitation programme for Japan during the 1949 fiscal year commencing July, 1948, (apart from the Occupation costs and civilian relief scheme), the Japanese Press, as a whole, holds that the responsibility for the rebuilding of Japanese economy devolves on the Japanese nation itself. The objective of the proposed scheme is to make Japan economically self-supporting as quickly as possible and to relieve the burden on the tax-

payers of America. It aims at the extension of credits for imports of industrial material, spare parts and other necessary commodities required to step up the output of peaceful Japanese industries. Authoritative sources have indicated that the U.S.A. Army Department will ask Congress for five hundred million dollars (including three hundred million for foodstuffs and clothing and two hundred million as credit for industrial recovery needs, such as raw materials and parts) in order to rehabilitate Japan economically.

FOREIGN TRADERS WELCOMED

The most sweeping move yet made towards restoring to normalcy commercial relations between Japan and the rest of the world since private trade was re-opened last August, was the recent announcement from General MacArthur's H.Q. that all quotas for foreign businessmen coming to Japan have been lifted. S.C.A.P. also stated that for the first time applications may be submitted for entry into Japan of persons wishing to make private investments or who are seeking restitution of property held in Japan before World War II. The new step will help businessmen to establish their claims and may lead to an early flow of trade when the peace treaty is signed. S.C.A.P. officials seem doubtful that lifting the quota will flood Japan with visiting traders, as at no time had the prescribed quota of 400 businessmen been filled. Moreover, under existing regulations, prospective investors can do no more than "have a look round" for reasonable enterprises in which to invest.

T.B. CONTROL

The incidence of tuberculosis in Japan is difficult to gauge with accuracy because, before March of last year, the Japanese were not compelled to report if suffering from the disease.

According to Dr. A. P. Knight, chief of S.C.A.P.'s Tuberculosis Control Branch, the average T.B. case rate per 100,000 of Japan's population is about 550, or one of every 200 people. The trouble is that there are thousands who suffer from it and will not report it. Indeed, Japan has, at present, the third highest T.B. death rate in the world (about 200 per 100,000), exceeded only by Chile and Brazil. The Japanese consider it a disgrace to the family and to the individual to be stricken with T.B. Means of arresting the progress of the disease are now being planned by the Japanese Welfare Ministry and by Military Government health experts.

But to get the T.B. rate lowered in Japan will also mean a long-term policy of re-education to stamp out old prejudices. For instance, no Japanese family to-day would accept a daughter-in-law on whom a diagnosis of T.B. had been confirmed, and the result is that no eligible young Japanese women suffering from the disease willingly comes forward for treatment. Moreover, Japanese doctors sometimes "fail" to make a correct diagnosis, knowing that, if they do tell the truth it won't make much difference since the family will only go to another doctor who, in order to accommodate the family, will also find the test negative. The result of this is that most of the cases that do reach hospital are in the advanced stage.

KABUKI PREFERRED

A public poll has revealed that the Japanese classic drama of Kabuki is still popular among young and old, despite a general impression that this time-honoured art is rapidly fading. One old-established Kabuki theatre, the Mitsukoshi, approached 324 persons and found that 190 of them preferred Kabuki to the Western entertainment, or, perhaps I should say, their nation's conception of it. A little research tells me that the real originator of Kabuki drama was a woman called Okuni, a priestess,

who trained a group of dancing girls for performances in the dry bed of the river Kamo in Kyoto, ancient capital of Japan, in the early seventeenth century. From about the middle of the Tokugawa period this type of dance-drama is said to have been enthusiastically received and, at first, it seems that the actors, impersonating both men and women, more or less extemporised their parts without attention to the script. The Kabuki also would seem to have been preserved till to-day partly because of its traditional simplicity and partly because of public affection for it as a link with Old Japan.

CRIME TOPICS

The widest man-hunt in the annals of the Japanese C.I.D. was launched after a crop-haired, middle-aged man, aided by accomplices, posed as a health inspector and induced 16 persons in the Shiinamachi branch of the Teikoku Bank (near Tokyo) to take poison, killing 12 of them. Motive—robbery. The police expressed to me the belief that the culprit was familiar with medicine and epidemic prevention and that he knew the district and the bank well on the following premises (a) dysentery cases had been reported in the district; (b) he wore the armband of the Tokyo Metropolitan Sanitation Bureau and did not arouse suspicion among the 16 who drank the poison. The police, at the time of writing, are working on descriptions given by four survivors of the slaying and are pulling in underworld characters and innocent citizens who bear the slightest resemblance to the description of the wanted man. In an "inflation" country like Japan, the fact that the numbers of the stolen bank notes are known is not very helpful. The ordinary Japanese just couldn't be bothered comparing the number on a yen note with that on the police circular. Conversations with Japanese about this bank-robbery-by-poison, as it is called, seem to reflect that they regard the chief perpetrator more in the nature of a "smart fellow" than as a criminal. Doubts about the ability of the police to catch the poisoner are being made the subject of wise-cracks by Japanese stage comedians. The murder, with close-up pictures of the corpses lying in the bank, got a big spread in the sensational papers of Japan.

KYOTO CONTRASTS

In the Miyazu gaol of this Blackpool of Japan, was an inventive inmate who had been successfully playing a dual role—that of a model prisoner by day and house-breaker by night. Our Japanese spiv, Takeda-san by name, one night happened to find that the lock of his cell door had been broken by too much slamming. This, said Takeda-san to himself, was tempting providence. *Do itashimashite*. Thus began a series of nightly perambulations, the sequence of which was a climb over the prison wall, a visit to some likely house which might profit a burglar, another visit to a cache to hide the "swag," and then back home—to his cell. Always the astute prisoner was in time for the morning roll-call. Then another prisoner, probably envious, "sang" Takeda-san's Night-And-Day number to the authorities and the result was another "two years" (in a different prison) and the demotion of the chief warden of the gaol as a "punishment for his loose administration."

CHINESE BRIGANDS

by W. Stark Toller, C.M.G., O.B.E.

(The following incidents are some with which the author happened to come in direct or indirect contact, and are not necessarily typical of Chinese brigands in general. They mostly relate to one time and one place—Szechuan in 1919-1920.)

ALTHOUGH my travels in China often led me through brigand-infested areas, I was fortunate enough never to come in contact with members of the fraternity actively engaged in the pursuit of their profession. There was one whom I met on the Burma border in 1935, who said he had "retired," but as he was, at the time, functioning as a collector of taxes, there was some room for doubt as to the genuineness of his retirement.

The really retired brigand was, when I met him in 1930, a general in the Chinese (Szechuan) army; when I last heard of him, he was in the field against the Japanese. When I made his acquaintance, he did not attempt to gloss over his past life; he professed to be horrified at some of the things he had done when living "in the green woods," but he never gave any details. He certainly did not give the impression of a ferocious bandit; he seemed rather a mild gentleman, and he had a great reputation among the poor of Chungking as a philanthropist. He was a teetotaller, and also a very keen sportsman; he was a mighty hunter and also a very enthusiastic tennis player. He used to keep two or three professionals on his staff, and he practised assiduously whenever his military duties permitted. But his career as an exponent of lawn tennis nearly came to a premature end; he took his troops down-river in 1931 or 1932 to fight against the Communists, and in the course of the operations his right arm was shattered. It was feared that amputation would be necessary, but he insisted that the arm should be saved at all costs. When I last saw him, he still had his right arm, but it was useless for tennis, so he had set to work again and had learnt to play left-handed.

The other brigand whom I met also became an officer in the army, but his subsequent career was very different. When I met him, he was a prisoner under sentence of death. For reasons best known to themselves, the authorities delayed carrying out the sentence, and in the meantime his gang kidnapped an English missionary and his wife, within a few miles of Chungking, and sent a message demanding that their leader should be handed over to them in exchange for their captives. After much discussion, the Chinese authorities agreed to this course; then a difficulty arose as to how the exchange was to be carried out. The brigands did not trust the Chinese authorities enough to release the missionaries on their promise to set free the brigand chief after this had been done; the Chinese authorities were not prepared to trust to the brigands carrying out their part of the bargain, so there was a deadlock. I told the Chinese that if they could not do something at once to get over this, I was going straight out to the brigands' camp to discuss the matter with them. The authorities then came to the conclusion that the only possible course was to trust to the honour of the brigands and to release their chief. This was done: before he left the brigand chief gave me a

passport which would, he said, render me immune from attack throughout the province. I have no doubt that it would have done so, but I never had occasion to put it to the test.

The brigand chief was thus set free and returned to his friends, and he at once proved that the risk of trusting him was justified. Not only did he release the missionaries, but he got out his band of bugles to give them a parting salute, decorated their sedan chairs with red cloth, and let off a fusillade of crackers in their honour. All their goods were returned intact, and he also gave them a sum of money in compensation for the delay of their journey.

But my brigand acquaintance did not long survive his liberation. The great aim of every brigand leader in those days was to get together a gang so strong that it would be worth the while of one or other of the warring generals to "summon him to peace," as it was termed—in other words, to take over his gang as a unit of the army. (The main source of recruitment for the brigand bands was deserters or the remnants of a defeated army, so that it worked in a vicious circle). This is what happened in the case of "my" brigand, and he became a colonel. Soon afterwards the general gave a dinner in honour of the new colonel; at the end of the dinner the new colonel was seized, led out, and shot.

It was the state of civil war that was prevalent in Szechuan in those days that made the province such a happy hunting ground for brigands. There was always a no-man's-land between the territories controlled by rival generals, and this no-man's-land was, naturally, the stamping ground of the brigands. There was a particularly bad spot of this sort on the main road between Chengtu, the capital of the province, and Chungking. A company of missionaries travelling from Chengtu to Chungking thought they would make a détour and by-pass this danger spot, but they had not gone far before they were fired on and compelled to return to the main road. The brigands started rummaging their luggage, so they explained that they were missionaries and were not carrying valuable goods. The brigands thereupon showed magnanimity and said that they knew missionaries were there to do good works so they would not rob them; they had, however, broken the rules by trying to by-pass the brigand village (which was suitably named "The Village of Great Peace"), so it was only equitable that they should pay for the ammunition expended to bring them back to the right way. The cost of this was assessed at \$3.50 (seven or eight shillings); this the missionaries duly paid, but in the end the brigands handed it back to them.

Sometimes the brigands seemed to be unconscious humorists. On one occasion they captured the Chinese pastor of a church in Chungking and held him for ransom. One evening when the brigands and their "fat pigs," as such captives were called, were sitting out taking the air,

the pastor noticed a steep declivity which seemed to offer possibilities of escape. He edged over towards it and sat there smoking his pipe, and then, when no one was looking his way, he slid down the slope and made his escape. Shortly afterwards the missionary in charge of the church, who was a friend of mine, received a letter from the brigands denouncing the pastor and demanding his expulsion from the church. He had, they said, enjoyed their hospitality for several days and had not only left without paying them, but had not even had the common courtesy

to wish them "Good-bye."

Another band of brigands followed the principles of the "Pirates of Penzance," except that they spared Christians instead of orphans. But the outcome was the same: they soon found that everyone travelling on the road was a Christian. Not having heard of any revival movement they became suspicious, so the next time a traveller claimed immunity on the ground of his Christianity they put him to the test and required him to repeat the Lord's Prayer.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The Struggle in China

Sir,—In his letter published in your February issue Mr. Jack Chen accuses me of distorting Mao Tze-tung's reference (in his New Year review of the Chinese Communists' situation) to the projected "liberation" (quotation marks are mine to indicate that the word is used in its Communist meaning) of "the thousand million peoples of the East."

The sentences quoted in my article were transcribed from the report of Mao Tze-tung's speech in the Weekly Bulletin of January 6th, of the New China News Agency, the London Organ of the Chinese Communists, which I believe Mr. Chen directs.

If Mao's words do not mean that Chinese Communism looks forward to the communising of other Asiatic countries as well as China as a part of its undertaking, it is hard to see what they do mean. I do not know where Mr. Chen got the version of Mao's speech which he gives in his letter to you, but in practical effect there does not appear to be any essential difference between it and the report which I quoted.

The answer to Mr. Chen's complaint that I use the same arguments for supporting General Chiang Kai-shek now as in 1927 is easy. The danger to China is the same now as then, only ten times worse. I notice that Mr. Chen has nothing to say of the far-reaching concessions made to the Communists by General Chiang at the All-Party Conference in Chungking in January, 1946; of his many public appeals to them to co-operate in the Government on the basis of those concessions; of the seats reserved for them and their allies, the Democratic League, in the Coalition Government formed last April, which if accepted, would have put the Kuomintang in a minority; and that throughout all this period (i.e. from the Chungking Conference until some months after the forming of the Coalition Government), General Chiang held back from big military operations against the Communists. These are awkward facts for the Communists, the memory of which they are now trying to blur by ceaseless vulgar abuse of General Chiang.

The concluding paragraphs of Mr. Chen's letter to you, Sir, suggest an idyllic picture of conditions in the Communist areas. A different account was given in a long article by *The Times* correspondent in Peking, published on February 12th. The writer says that the Communists' distribution of land among the peasants,

"their propaganda about the welfare of the common people" and good discipline of the troops makes them at first welcome, "if not enthusiastically" among the peasants. But,

"... after a time the constant political meetings and the regimentation of the private life of everyone become irksome. Finally, the peasants become bitter and secret enemies of the new dispensation when they discover that they are taxed as heavily as before and are subject to conscription, forced labour and even the harsh treatment originally meted out to their wealthier neighbours. Whether the people of China, who are at heart rugged individualists, can be held down, even with the sternest measures, only the future can show."

The importance of this description is enhanced by the fact that in the past two or three years *The Times* has published articles by no means unsympathetic to the régime of the Chinese Communists and that the Peking correspondent of *The Times* lives in an area where the facts of life in Communist territory are easily accessible.

Yours, etc.,

O. M. GREEN

London, E.C.4.

Britons in India

Dear Sir,—The substance of Mr. Neil Stewart's three recent articles in this paper gives an incomplete and inaccurate picture. While I appreciate the fact that it is sometimes easier to criticise the conduct of Britons abroad than to support them, I feel that his articles have failed in their most important duty, that of presenting the whole truth, as far as it can be done in the space available.

Quotations taken out of their context may easily prove a point to an author's satisfaction, but surely, in an article entitled "Britons in India," something might have been said of a few good things a few good Britons have done. This does not mean that there should be a catalogue of the number of canals built and that sort of thing, but rather that our record is not entirely a black one and there might be some gleams of brightness in it.

The first point that should have been mentioned is the genuine liking that most British officers had for Indians in the Indian Army, which was mutual. This also applies to many I.C.S. officers. I know from personal experience that many officers have written and still write to their former comrades, Indian Officers, Viceroy's Commissioned Officers and other ranks. This is not dictated by principles of racial superiority and such-like but by mutual regard which has continued long after the officers left India; and on the other side after any personal advantage could be gained by the continuance of such a friendship and after independence had been achieved. It is well known how

former comrades in the British Army so easily forget one another after a war is over.

Mr. Neil Stewart's assertion that "British rule in India has bred a foul streak of racial hatred which has still to be eradicated in Britain," is as malicious as it is false. His statement that the high moral tone of such men as Sir Henry Lawrence, Brigadier Nicholson and their like failed to bring about a happier relationship with the Indians should also be denied. The story of John Nicholson shows that he was liked and admired by all who came into contact with him, and so it has been with many other Britons. In fact, the high moral standards of some individuals find appreciation more easily in a religiously minded country like India than practically anywhere else in the world.

In his articles on the Indian Army he has put the cart before the horse. Our political policy may have had little to recommend it and its justification or blaming lies outside the scope of this letter. However, the object of any administration is to have an army that is loyal to the state and free from political influences. To condemn the actions of successive Commanders-in-Chief in carrying out policies to enable this to be achieved is entirely wrong. The army is the servant of the state and not its master.

The reason for recruiting from the North and from the hills in Kitchener's day was not primarily to recruit men "who were free from the influences of this rising nationalist movement," but rather to enable the relatively small Indian Army to have in its ranks men who, by reason of their superior physique, were best able to withstand the physical strain of infantry campaigns on the North-West Frontier and elsewhere.

The class company system, perhaps, had many faults but it certainly also had much to recommend it. Firstly (particularly recently), it provided a means of keeping the "opposing tension neutralised" as Mr. Neil Stewart suggests. That is fundamentally important under any regime, and any countercharge that communal political parties could not have developed if the communities in the Army had been mixed up would be entirely untrue.

Secondly, it preserved the British from the potential criticism that the religion of the men in the Army was being tampered with, by enabling the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers of each community to supervise their men's religious observances which are so much more exacting than in this country. Thirdly, at the time of the Mutiny and long afterwards there were no regular quartermaster services, as we now know them. Later, with the introduction of army rations, separate cookhouses became necessary and it is easier to allot them to different companies for administrative convenience; so that this tended to preserve the system.

Finally, by allowing men to serve under Viceroy's Commissioned Officers who came from their own tribe or village, discipline was enhanced and the all-important prestige or "izzat" of the troop or platoon commander in his own locality was increased. In conclusion, I would repeat that, whatever the faults of the civil administration in Whitehall and Delhi, the Army's policy was only the natural result of it and so should not be thus criticised.

Yours, etc.,

(Sgd.) RODERICK W. GOLDSWORTHY.

Trinity Hall, Cambridge.

Australian Statement

Dear Sir,—In certain sections of the press this week Mr. Calwell, the Australian Immigration Minister, was quoted as saying that Japanese wives of Australians would not be allowed to enter the Commonwealth, "since it would be the grossest act of public indecency to permit any Japanese of either sex to pollute Australian shores while any relatives remain of Australian soldiers dead in Pacific battlefields." We would like to ask whether it would be considered more ethical for Australians to live in Japan where over 130,000 civilians, largely women and children, were killed by the two Atom bombs.

It seems to us deplorable that such an attitude should be taken by a responsible member of a Government to which British Commonwealth dealings with Japan are largely entrusted.

Yours, etc.,

J. P. JUDD
P. G. O'NEILL

School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London.

Gen. MacArthur and Japanese Monopolies

In reply to criticism made in the U.S. Senate, calling the S.C.A.P. administration in Japan too socialistic, General MacArthur explained his views in a letter which contains the following passage:—

"In any evaluation of the economic potential here in Japan it must be understood that a tearing down of the traditional pyramid of economic power which has given only a few Japanese families direct or indirect control over all commerce and industry, all raw materials, all transportation, internal and external, and all coal and other resources, is the first essential step to establishment here of an economic system based upon free private competitive enterprise which Japan has never before known. Even more, it is indispensable to the growth of democratic government and life, as the abnormal economic system heretofore in existence can only thrive if the people are held in poverty and slavery.

"The Japanese people fully understand the nature of the forces which have so ruthlessly exploited them in the past. They understand that this economic concentration not only furnished sinews for mounting the violence of war but that its leaders, in partnership with the military, shaped the national will in the direction of war and conquest.

"And they understand no less fully that the material wealth comprising this vast concentration at the war's start increased as the war progressed, at the forfeiture of millions of Japanese lives, as resources heretofore only indirectly controlled came under direct control and ownership.

"These things are so well understood by the Japanese people that, apart from our desire to re-shape Japanese life toward capitalistic philosophy, if this concentration of economic power is not torn down and re-distributed peacefully and in due order under the occupation, there is not the slightest doubt that its cleansing will eventually occur through a blood-bath of revolutionary violence. For the Japanese people have tasted freedom under the American concept and will not willingly return to the shackles of authoritarian government and economy or re-submit otherwise to their discredited masters."

ECONOMIC SECTION

Japanese Menace to British Rayon

by Vera K. Watkins

(British Rayon Federation)

THE British Rayon Industry has been given one of the toughest assignments of any group in the battle for Britain's economic survival. And the measure of this toughness may best be understood by considering the present textile situation in Japan, as disclosed by the recent report of the American State Army Textile Mission.

To get the picture clearly in focus, let us review the achievements of the British Rayon Industry to date and the target set for it by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Rayon in Britain through the war years was very severely concentrated. Yarn and staple fibre producers were limited in the types of yarns they might supply. Spinners and speciality weavers were either merged with other firms or turned over almost exclusively to utility production or service clothing fabrics. Altogether, 60 per cent. and, at times, as much as 70 per cent. of British rayon output went to the utility scheme; work on experimental fabrics was almost entirely suspended and the labour force largely dispersed. Despite these handicaps, British rayon exports in 1947 were nearly seven times in value of those of 1938. Moreover, more than 95 per cent. of rayon exports represent sheer currency gain to the national economy.

Rayon production and rayon fabric manufacture in Great Britain are an important economic factor in the life of the community all over the country. Every textile industry—wool, silk, cotton, linen, jute—can and does use rayon as an important and less expensive alternative raw material to mix with or replace the natural fibres when these are in short supply. New rayon production plants in development areas are going up as fast as present shortages and restrictions allow, with the express purpose not only of increasing much-needed output, but also of taking up the slack of unemployment caused in some districts by the slowing down and cessation of wartime industries.

A Rayon Research Association and a Rayon Design Centre, both with government backing, have been recently inaugurated with a view to stimulating the British Textile Industries as a whole, through the reviving power of new developments in rayon, to a restoration of textile exports to something of their traditional importance in our balance of trade. The immediate target set for 1948 is a 245 per cent. increase on the 1938 figures.

So far, so good. The industry is on its toes—working like beavers to achieve its desired result. But what of those who regard rayon as such a nice safe plaything for ex-enemies who must be allowed to support themselves, but who must not be allowed to develop a war potential? Rayon, after all, can hardly be regarded as a lethal weapon. Or can't it—taking a long view?

Let us look at Japan. The brains which, in the period between the wars, persuaded many people that Japan was a land of geisha girls hand-reeling silk cocoons in their spare time, now appear to be engaged in putting over an impression of bomb blast and shortages and general post-war helplessness.

But just as the first picture masked a relentless, highly mechanised export drive in textiles, based on ample supplies of very cheap labour, so the present idea of Japan's helplessness covers an extremely promising situation—for the Japanese. And one that is definitely menacing for Great Britain.

Before the war, Japan's economy largely turned on silk, but her largest crop only produced 108 million pounds—all of which could have been absorbed by her own population (since Japan has no cotton or wool)—and this was far too small to be of value in the world's textile trade. So Japan took to rayon, first to supply her own people and increase the margin of silk available for export, and later as a profitable export on its own account to the mass markets of the Far East, which had formerly been the foundation for the Lancashire cotton trade. Rayon, in fact, amounted to 6 per cent. of all Japanese exports pre-war.

During the course of the war, Japanese policy towards her rayon industry was nothing if not realistic. It was not bombing but deliberate scrapping that destroyed four-fifths of the rayon yarn capacity and three-fifths of the rayon staple capacity. These plants were scrapped in stages starting with the oldest and least efficient. It was done (a) to get scrap for war industries, (b) to turn some of the plants to war production, and (c) to drive employees into war-work.

The American Mission discovered that reconstruction plans were ready to replace the scrapped plants in strict order of pre-war efficiency and that, not only had the Japanese government planned to pay for all equipment scrapped, but that two-thirds of the payment had already been made at the time of the Mission's visit.

Of course, the actual value of the bonds issued for payment is doubtful in present circumstances, but active plants were found to be under way for reconversion in several instances and any Japanese company installing new machinery proposes to make use of the latest and most progressive types.

Moreover, there is no reason why this should not be done. The Japanese are excellent machinery-makers and this textile machinery industry is in very good shape for expansion (if permitted) to meet not only a clamouring world demand for textile machinery, but to put their own textile industry in the front rank for supplying world markets. Their knowledge of fibre mixtures is good: the co-operation in research between educational bodies and industrialists is close. Wood for pulp is available in Japan, though it may be found advisable to import high grade pulp. The Japanese coal shortage, like our own, is only

caused by temporary difficulties in getting it out of the ground. Transport is well planned and cheap. The only raw material the Japanese must import is salt for the necessary caustic soda.

From an economic angle, the position is equally serious for Britain. The Japanese, for the time being at any rate, have lost the United States market for silk, which is at present being replaced by rayon, particularly by nylon. On the other hand, the United States have been using the Japanese textile industry as an outlet for their surplus cotton. But this arrangement has not been successful and it is proving very difficult to find dollar markets for the cloth when woven—and dollar markets are essential to cover the cost of the original purchase of American cotton by the Commodity Credits Corporation.

Thus Japan, with the active support of the United States, joins in the world scramble for dollars as our competitor. Her natural markets—India, China, and other Asiatic countries—are also Great Britain's traditional markets. But they, in their turn, could find outlets in Japan for cotton, rubber, wool, and other raw materials, thus raising the general level of their own standard of living and increasing the potential purchasing power for the more costly British textiles. This, in effect, would mean that Japan joined the sterling rather than the dollar area.

Finally, a very important aspect of this complicated situation is that of wages. At present, the United States—Britain's most important customer for all the years the American Loan has yet to run—is busy (a) supporting an ex-enemy to compete with an ex-ally in acquiring the vital dollars we need for survival and (b) re-establishing a highly developed industry on what is most probably a very temporary basis of higher wage levels. Once the control of American occupation is removed (and a large part of American opinion is anxious that it should be removed quickly) there is no telling what effect the pressure of population and unemployment is likely to have on Japanese wages. Illusions as to the real growth of democratic convictions as opposed to an expedient and temporary fashion for wage rates and conditions comparable with western standards are very dangerous. The outlook for the British textiles is grim.

The British Rayon Federation is not without plans for meeting this situation as it arises. But, of course, the Federation would welcome any change of policy in high places which would make its task easier. A purely voluntary co-operative scheme was coping quite effectively with Japanese competition in certain markets, notably West Africa, as long ago as 1940—before Pearl Harbour. That scheme later played a very valuable part in supplying rayon textiles at prices native markets could afford to pay—and which acted as incentive goods for the encouragement of food production by native labour and native traders. It still operates, and it can, at any time, be expanded. The experience in handling it is ready to be used.

But, meantime, throughout the Industry there is keen realisation that Britain's role in textiles has changed. We taught the world how to make cloth by machinery in the first place, we invented and pioneered the commercial production of the man-made fibres. To-day, we must market our skill and ingenious originality again; we must

so organise the industry that we ourselves reap the rewards of our inventiveness at once and continuously, leaving other nations to copy us in providing for the mass markets.

But, to do this, we must re-establish our reputation for absolute top-quality production; we must build our reputation anew for speciality fabrics of unsurpassed excellence; and the leaders of the Rayon Industry, while fully appreciating the responsibilities of victory and the difficulties of statesmanship, are asking, very seriously, whether it is long term or even short term commonsense to restrict, by government control, the manufacture of speciality, novelty and top-quality cloths among our own people while encouraging the French, the Italians, the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Germans and the Japanese, first four, to establish their reputations even here in our not only to revive their industries, but, in the case of the not only is the British public, as a whole, being led to lose own home market. The result of the present policy is that confidence in Britain's textile skills, but visitors to Britain not only find her shops full of other nations' textiles, but the most distinguished, the people whose taste is followed in their own country, find their British hostesses dressed in foreign rayons. The inference is obvious—on their own showing the British regard their fabrics as second best. How are the mighty fallen!

Luckily, the mighty, in this case, are quite prepared to get up again and fight back. But a little home support would help—an export target of 245 per cent. over 1938 is a lot to expect . . . in fetters.

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BUSINESS IN CHINA

by J. R. Kaim (Shanghai)

PPRIVATE business in China, foreign as well as Chinese, is faced by new obstacles. Trade-regulations, restrictions and rules are growing like mushrooms. As the months go by, trading with China—and from China—becomes more and more complicated, hampered by a maze of rules which instead of clarifying the situation, tend only to deepen the confusion. Meanwhile, State-controlled and State-owned corporations are in a position to buy and sell. By printing banknotes with which its corporations will pay for domestic goods, and by selling the latter for foreign currency, no matter the price in foreign exchange, the State certainly has possibilities which commercial firms are unable to share.

In the case of China, interests of business on the one hand and the State on the other, are widely divergent. The Government, no doubt, is in bitter need of foreign exchange. The intrinsic value of its money is unknown. But it can buy, for such paper money, both gold and foreign exchange; all that is needed in a round-about way. The best means, obviously, is to buy domestic products and to ship them abroad. Whether, as has been alleged by American tung oil producers, Chinese Government corporations actually have "dumped" tung oil, however, still remains to be proved.

New import restrictions have been announced in February last. Import quotas have been reduced. Even importation of very essential raw materials at present is a growing problem and the scarcity of imported basic materials hampers domestic industrial production.

While the Government repeatedly has invited foreign capital to invest in China, it still does not permit to remit any future profits—or part of them—to would-be investors' homelands. Still more: when a large British concern decided to manufacture certain commodities in Shanghai, the company's local branch obtained the necessary Manufacturing Licence from the municipal authorities, but was informed by the Export-Import Board that no import licence would be granted. The firm was supposed to purchase its raw materials on the local market, even when its own brands were concerned. Industrial raw materials are imported by the importer on behalf of the manufacturer who holds a quota; the importer's own quota frequently is small, far too small at any rate for starting production of his own.

Private exporters, on the other hand, are not only faced with the competition of State-corporations, as mentioned above, but are practically excluded from several

fields. The fact is that while trading in tungsten ore, antimony, tung oil and several other commodities is not monopolised by the Government-controlled trusts, no private commercial enterprise can handle transactions in such commodities without direct or indirect governmental interference. These handicaps refer to all kinds of commercial firms. Chinese firms, in general, are confronted with exactly the same obstacles as foreign ones and, though it has frequently been alleged that great Chinese private-run concerns enjoy special facilities, no proof has ever been offered in this respect. In fact, to compare the great Chinese concerns with Japan's Zaibatsu, as has been done occasionally, is certainly a misconception: economically, the chief characteristic of the Japanese Zaibatsu was the close co-operation between that group of firms with the State and its institutions; the great Chinese private corporations, however, are facing almost the same difficulties as other commercial companies.

Their activities are not hampered, of course, by nationalist, political considerations. The fight for and against admitting foreign flags to inland shipping, for instance, shows that foreign investors are confronted with particular obstacles. Indeed, Chinese shipping quarters have made it clear that they oppose foreign shipping activities even if carried out under the Chinese flag; they insist that inland shipping is to be entirely in Chinese hands and oppose all suggestions to the contrary, even if made by the Government itself.

Meanwhile, smuggling into and from China is reported to continue. With import quotas lamentably small and U.N.R.R.A. shipments terminated, the demand

for smuggled imports certainly grows and apparently no control in Hong Kong or Macao can actually stop illegal trading. Nor can the Government hope to obtain all amounts in foreign exchange derived from exports. Though revised frequently, the official rates of exchange are still considered unrealistic and black exchanges usually are between 40 per cent. and 90 per cent. higher. High prices, in terms of foreign exchange, hamper commercial activities only as long as calculations are based on official rates and in many cases exports are possible when cargoes are shipped through illegitimate means, so that black exchange rates can be applied for the respective calculations. All suggestions with a view to altering the whole foreign trade system and to linking exports and imports —thus offering exporters part of their proceeds for imports —so far have been rejected by the Government.

Still, the picture would be far from complete would one not mention that, in spite of all those obstacles, traders are still carrying on. Apparently, profits are made. In spite of the law prohibiting the closing down of commercial enterprise, except in the case of bankruptcies, business would have many opportunities for practically terminating its activities. No such case is known, however, and even firms transplanting their chief offices from Shanghai to Hong Kong or Canton still continue to run their local enterprises. While certainly not living from hope alone but from real profits made, in spite of all obstacles and difficulties, they believe that in the not so distant future, matters may alter and prospects improve. They still hope that the civil war will come to a sudden end and that then conditions will normalise rapidly.

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Chinese Film Industry

OF all the post-war difficulties faced by the thirty-year-old Chinese film industry, that of purchasing films and other necessary equipment from abroad is the most serious. Since Chinese films have not been an export item, foreign exchange to buy film abroad has been increasingly difficult to obtain. This was stressed by Mr. H. Shelley Lowe—a prominent Chinese producer—at a conference in Shanghai last month. He urged the necessity to export successful Chinese productions in order to get foreign currency in exchange. The technical difficulties of the industry are partly overcome by painstaking efforts which produce enormously successful pictures like "The Barber Takes a Wife," which is a light comedy, and "The Tears of the Yangtze," an epic revealing the various aspects of life during the war. While the former has the highest box-office record of the Grand Theatre in Shanghai, a cinema usually confined to the showing of foreign-made pictures, the latter, shown in two sections of about two hours each, has been generally considered the best production of 1947, and has been awarded the Chinese equivalent of Hollywood's "Oscar." Produced by the Kunlun Film Company, it cost Ch.\$6,000 million. "Nepotism," a film based on a well known Chinese play, took second prize, but despite its outstanding box-office success, "The Barber Takes a Wife" was not chosen among the first 10 films.

Should the high standard attained by these pictures be maintained, there seems to be no reason why Chinese films should not find a considerable export market. Chinese producers hope that, with careful translation of the dialogue, they might be able to supply European cinema, especially now, when the Hollywood output has been cut by about half.

Speakers at the Conference emphasised the need for a completely changed approach to serious and true-to-life subjects in script writing, while the importance of the educational films and those made exclusively for children was also stressed. Representatives of the Chinese film industry pointed out that they suffered under the dumping of Hollywood films on the China market and under the fact that large numbers of theatres were under the control of foreign film companies in Shanghai. It must be expected that the Chinese film industry will gradually take charge of the distribution arrangements in China. To-day, there are less than 200 cinemas throughout the country. Mr Lo Ching-yu, Director of the China Movie Studio, estimated that 5,000 new theatres will be necessary to place the industry on a firmer basis. Dissatisfaction was also expressed by most speakers at the conference with a prevalent practice of making the actors' and actresses' appearance count more than their acting ability. The meeting, therefore, recommended the establishment of special film schools and decided to support the Chinese spoken drama which is now almost stagnant. Thus it is hoped to re-create a source and supply of able artists for Chinese films.

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ECONOMIC NOTES

CHINESE SILVER DOLLAR PLAN REJECTED

The Legislative Yuan's Financial Committee has rejected a currency reform plan submitted by Dr. Chang Chao-yuan,* calling for the issue of two billion silver dollars to replace the paper money now in circulation.

Dr. Chang recommended that China acquire a foreign loan of one billion ounces of silver for the minting of the coins. He was reported also to have suggested in his plan that, after economic conditions have been stabilised, bank notes of one, two and five dollar denominations might be issued with a fixed exchange rate between the silver dollars and bank notes. The Committee tabled the plan as unfeasible because it questioned China's ability to borrow the silver, and it called attention to the fact that there was no way to prevent the silver dollars from flowing into Communist areas. Also, according to the principles of economics, the bank notes as a "soft" currency would drive the "hard" currency out of circulation.

* See *Eastern World*, November, 1947, p. 19.

N.E.I. IMPORTS

New Exchange Control Regulations have been issued by the Netherlands Indies Government which envisage a more efficient control on all transactions involving foreign exchange. Goods shipped after February, 1948, may not be imported into the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) unless the importer is in possession of a certificate issued by the Department of Economic Affairs at Batavia stating that the import is not in violation of the existing Exchange Control Regulations of 1940. The importer will have to submit this document to the Customs Officer at the port of entry before he can take possession

of the merchandise. In order to cause as little difficulty as possible, the Exchange Control Permits will serve as certificates until the 1st May, 1948.

K.L.M. SCHEDULE CHANGE

Royal Dutch Airlines (K.L.M.) Constellation aircraft operating between Amsterdam and Batavia, are now once a week landing at Singapore on both eastbound and westbound flights. Sky-master aircraft on this service will continue to make scheduled landings at Singapore.

FIRST B.O.A.C. SERVICE TO JAPAN

The first British civil air service between the U.K. and Japan has been opened with B.O.A.C. extending their existing flying-boat route, now ending at Hong Kong, to Iwakuni, near Kure. Iwakuni, headquarters of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces, was chosen as the temporary terminal because facilities already exist there as it is a base for R.A.F. flying-boats. The ultimate terminal will be Tokio. Hong Kong to Iwakuni is being flown in one stage and this extension of the service adds 1,363 miles to the route, making an overall distance from Poole (Dorset) to Japan of 10,625 miles. Night stops are at Augusta, Cairo, Karachi, Calcutta, Bangkok and Hong Kong and the whole journey occupies seven days. Four-engined Plymouth flying-boats, equipped to carry 22 passengers, mail and cargo, are now operating the through service once weekly in each direction. Fares: £214 single and £385 return.

CZECHOSLOVAK TRADE

It will be interesting to see whether and how the latest developments in Czechoslovakia will influence her trade with the East. Out of her total imports amounting to 28,635 million Czech Crowns in 1947, she bought 551 million Kcs worth from India, and 167 million Kcs from Australia. During that year she exported to the value of 286 million Kcs to India and 122 million Kcs to Australia, out of a total export figure of 28,609 million.

U.K. TRADE

India and Pakistan imported at the rate of £91.6 million from the U.K. during 1947; Malaya £30.1 million. During the same period the U.K. imported £94.4 million worth from India and Pakistan, and £34.8 million from the N.E.I.

RUBBER GLUT?

The U.S. \$200 million netted last year by Malayan rubber makes Malaya Britain's biggest dollar earner. It compares with the \$180 million earned by manufactured goods exported from the U.K. There are signs, however, that rubber may not always be in such a favourable position. American legislation on synthetic rubber production comes to an end in March, 1948, and there are two bills before the House of Representatives in Washington to provide further legislation to help the U.S.A. synthetic rubber industry. The Shafer Bill would keep synthetic production at 225,000 tons a year. The Armed Forces Committee of the House of Representatives has already unanimously recommended that synthetic production should be kept at a high level. Mr. J. C. Bennett, Chairman of the London Rubber Trade Association, stated recently that if the Shafer Bill was passed it "would leave the U.S. government the virtual arbiter of the world price of crude rubber." As the U.S.A. is also the greatest consumer of raw rubber it is needless to comment on the way price would be influenced. After research costing U.S. \$15 million American scientists have produced a new synthetic rubber christened "Ultipara" which is claimed to be 20 per cent. superior to the natural product. It is going into production at the rate of 30,000 tons a year. Estimates of Netherlands Indies rubber production for 1948 are between 350 and 250,000 tons. These factors, combined with the threat of a slump in the U.S.A. would give credence to the Prophecies of American economists that there will be a rubber glut this year. It is estimated that U.S. consumption will be 800,000 tons against over one million in 1947.

ALL-INDIA INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRICES DURING 1947

(Base: year ended August 1939 = 100)

Commodity Groups	January 1	February 2	March 3	April 4	May 5	June 6	July 7	August 8	Sept. 9	Oct. 10	Nov. 11	Dec. 12
Food Articles ...	290.6	290.1	286.2	279.9	278.6	287.4	291.5	297.8	296.2	295.3	294.8	321.1
Industrial Raw Materials...	343.3	352.1	362.9	356.2	352.6	361.5	371.0	366.5	371.6	376.6	377.9	394.7
Semi-Manufactured Articles	241.2	242.2	248.9	249.7	249.0	250.7	256.0	258.3	258.1	256.8	252.5	259.9
Manufactured Products ...	272.0	272.7	270.9	270.1	271.6	273.5	274.9	280.2	282.6	283.5	283.2	284.0
Miscellaneous ...	491.5	497.4	489.8	467.6	453.2	474.0	449.8	456.6	457.8	468.2	460.8	454.2
All Commodities	290.5	292.2	293.2	289.6	288.5	294.2	297.7	301.4	302.4	303.2	302.0	314.2

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